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Abstract
The Seleucid Empire expanded its territory to stretch from Thrace to India under the
leadership of Antiochus III, making it one of the most expansive empires in the Hellenistic
World. Antiochus III’s subsequent loss at the Battle of Magnesia to Rome in 190 B.C. caused
some of the satrapies of the empire to begin to rebel, and has led some historians to believe that
the empire began an unrecoverable decline. In this investigation I will argue that the myth of
decline in the post-Antiochus III era is invalid through analyzing the stability brought to the
empire during the reign of his son, Antiochus IV. An investigation into Antiochus IV’s
stabilization of the Seleucid Empire has not been completed in English since 1966. Through
analyzing his involvement in the southern and eastern regions of the Seleucid Empire as well as
the internal reforms a clear picture of Antiochus IV’s efforts towards stabilization becomes
apparent.
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Introduction
Upon the death of Alexander the Great the vast territories that he conquered fell into the
control of several people close to him, ushering in a new era of the Hellenistic world. The
Seleucid Empire, one of the largest post-Alexander Hellenistic empires, lasted for over two
hundred years, at its height stretching from Greece to India. Most historical research conducted
on the Seleucid Empire has focused on the first half of its existence, approximately 312 B.C. to
187 B.C., concluding with the death of Antiochus III and the Treaty of Apamea that triggered
financial, territory, and military losses throughout the Empire. Some historians mark this series
of events as the beginning of the decline of the Seleucid Empire; however, the reign of
Antiochus IV shows a resurgence of the Seleucid Empire and the ability to recover from the
losses endured at Magnesia.

Background
The Seleucid Empire was established in 312 B.C. as a result of the dissolution of the
territory once conquered by Alexander the Great.1 The territory was split, creating several
empires including the Seleucid Empire in Syria and Mesopotamia and the Ptolemaic Empire in
Egypt. Under the leadership of its first two kings, Seleucus I (312-281 B.C.) and Antiochus I
(281-261 B.C.), the Seleucid Empire was able to expand its territory to control a large portion of
what had been conquered by Alexander the Great. By the end of his reign, Seleucus I had
expanded his influence from Thrace in Greece to the borders of India.2 In the subsequent decades
1

Susan Sherwin-White and Kuhrt, From Samarkhand to Sardis: A New Approach to the Seleucid Empire (Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 10.
2
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the expansion of the empire stopped and the territory that the early kings conquered began to
erode. The empire lacked the great leadership of the early kings that was desperately needed to
maintain the Seleucid Empire’s borders.
Antiochus III came into power in 223 B.C. at a very young age. He was the leader the
Seleucid Empire needed.3 He reacquired the territory lost under earlier kings and expanded the
territory even further. In the West, he brought the wealthy cities of Asia Minor under Seleucid
control beginning in 213 B.C.4 In 209 B.C. He took back the territory of Ecbatana, pushed the
Parthians back in the East, and forced both Parthia and Bactria to accept Seleucid dominance.5
He was also able to conquer Gaza in the South, bring Jerusalem and the surrounding area under
Seleucid Control by 198 B.C.6 His military achievement brought prestige to the Seleucid Empire
and expanded its influence. Also, in addition to his military achievements, he was able to make
political gains as well. For Example, Antiochus III married one of his daughters to Ptolemy V,
the king of the Ptolemaic Empire in Egypt, bringing an alliance between the rival Hellenistic
empire.
Eventually, upon the request of the Aitolian League, Antiochus III moved further west,
entering Greece with an army of 10,000 infantry, 500 cavalry, and six elephants in 192 B. C. to
aid in their struggle against Rome.7 In 192 B.C., Rome and the Seleucid Empire began a war that
would mark Rome’s first conflict in Asia, ending with the defeat of the Seleucid Empire in the

3
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University Press, 1985), XXXV: 14; Grainger, 191.
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battle of Magnesia.8 The Romans defeated Antiochus III, and the subsequent treaty, the Treaty of
Apamea, made the defeat official in 188 B.C.
The terms of the Treaty of Apamea are key to understanding the Seleucid Empire’s postwar society, as the terms had economic, social, and military consequences to the empire. The
treaty stated that the King must withdraw east of the Taurus Mountains. Livy claims that he was
told to “keep [his] hands off Europe.”9 In addition to the territorial losses in the West, many
provinces in the East rebelled in an attempt to gain independence from the Seleucid Empire.10
Rome also demanded that Antiochus pay the full cost of the war, 15,000 talents, 500 to be paid
immediately and the rest to be paid over twelve years.11 Antiochus III’s son, Antiochus IV, was
taken as a prisoner to Rome as well. One of the final terms required the Seleucid Empire to
destroy its remaining naval fleet and its war elephant forces. Out of all the terms listed in the
Treaty of Apamea, only 500 talents had to be paid upfront leaving much of the terms to be
decided later on.12
In addition to the demands of the Treaty of Apamea, the Seleucid Empire experienced
another loss in 187 B.C. with the death of Antiochus III.13 He died while on campaign in the
East, attempting to acquire the funds needed to pay the debt to Rome.14 The loss of the leader
who had brought heightened power and prestige to the Seleucid Empire is a key turning point in
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understanding the Seleucid Empire as a whole, as his death led to the defection of many some of
the territories he had conquered. Antiochus III was arguably the most successful Seleucid king,
and his death marks a significant loss to the empire.
The goal of the Romans was to cripple the Seleucid Empire in order to prevent it from
interfering in Roman affairs again. In the immediate aftermath of the Treaty of Apamea it
appears as if the Romans succeeded in their goal. Territories in the East rebelled and the
successful Seleucid King died.15 The terms, their repercussions, and the ability for the Seleucid
kings to circumvent them will be important to understanding the power the Seleucid rulers held
globally in the Ancient World.
The internal strife between the Seleucid Kings and the satraps of some of the satrapies
has led some historians to believe that the decline of the Seleucid Empire occurred much earlier
than it did. Despite the advancements of later kings, some authors have argued that the Seleucid
Empire began its decline from its inception. F. W. Walbank’s argument in The Hellenistic World
exemplifies this position. Through his work on the Seleucid Empire, Walbank emphasizes
internal conflict in claiming that the Empire was in decline from just after its inception.16 Other
authors such as Cam Rea mirror Walbank’s argument.17 This Roman-o-centric view of the East
can be discredited though looking at the expansion of territory, military accomplishments, and
economic status of the Seleucid Empire under Antiochus III and Antiochus IV.

15
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There are also authors who argue that the losses from the Treaty of Apamea, including
the loss of Antiochus III, marked the point of no return for the Seleucid Empire on its path to
destruction. For example, Grainger writes, “The result [of the war with Rome] was… [a] fatal
weakening of the Seleukid Empire.”18 His statement is reliant on the idea that the military,
economic, and territorial losses to Rome after the Battle of Magnesia sent the Seleucid Empire
down a path to decline that was not recoverable.
In a final category, there are scholars who argue that the Seleucid Empire went into
decline well after the Battle of Magnesia due to other internal and external factors. One major
aspect of this argument is shown through the work of Sherwin-White and Kuhrt. While
discussing the aftermath of Apamea they argue that, “The Seleucids still controlled the territory
from Cilcia to… Pakistan.”19 The power of the Seleucid Empire could still be seen over a vast
territory and politically they held prestige in several parts of the Hellenistic World. What the
Seleucid Empire needed most was a leader who could make the political, economic, and military
decisions needed to recover from the loss at Magnesia. Those who address the advancement of
the Seleucid Empire after the Treaty of Apamea agree that the empire did not go into a state of
full decline until the rule of later kings; however, their discussion of the post-Antiochus III
Seleucid Empire is mostly reserved to a conclusionary chapter. The events of the post-Antiochus
III era of the Seleucid Empire have a large impact on the evolving relationships between the
Roman, Greek, and Eastern worlds.

18
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Thesis
Very little research is devoted to the Seleucid Empire overall, having very few studies
published about it in the last twenty years in English, and even less attention is given to the
period just after the fall of Antiochus III at the battle of Magnesia. Although there have been
works published in German and French, the last book written in English on Antiochus IV was
published in 1966.20 This work will attempt to analyze the period after the fall of Antiochus III in
order to better understand the timeline of the decline of the Seleucid Empire and the stability
brought to it during the reign of one of Antiochus III’s son, Antiochus IV.
The question of the timing of the decline of the Seleucid Empire is one debated by
Scholars today. The military defeat, monetary losses, and provincial losses due to the Treaty of
Apamea proved to be detrimental to the Seleucid Empire; however, the reign of Antiochus IV
will show that the empire was not in full decline during his reign and that his political, social,
and military reforms and campaigns show that the Seleucid Empire was a strong and stable
Eastern power during his reign (175 B.C. to 164 B.C.). Through addressing the military,
economic, and territorial gains under the leadership of Antiochus IV the stability that he brought
to the empire becomes apparent.

20
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Chapter 1: The Southern Conflicts
After the death of Antiochus III in 187 B.C., his son, Seleucus IV, ascended to the throne.
Very little is known about his reign. Mostly, it is believed that he reigned in a traditional fashion
and did not achieve much in rebuilding and improving the Empire.21 Appian records him as
being sickly and unable to command the obedience of the army.22 In 175 B.C., he was murdered
by his minister Heliodorus, who replaced him with a young Antiochus in an attempt to take
control of the throne for himself as the guardian. Very little is known about the young Antiochus
except that he was a very young boy and would not ever survive to rule the Seleucid Empire on
his own. There are historians that argue that Heliodorus was put into power as a pawn by Rome;
however, this is not widely accepted.23 Upon hearing of the coup, Antiochus IV began to make
his way to the capital of the Seleucid Empire, Antioch. He had recently been released from Rome
in a trade for Seleucus IV’s son, Demetrius. With the Aid of the King of Pergamum, Eumenes II,
he forcefully took control of the throne from Heliodorus. 24

The Early Years of Antiochus IV’s Reign
The reign of Antiochus IV proves to be the best example of the sustained Seleucid power
after the death of Antiochus III. According to Appian, Antiochus IV was given the name
Epiphanes (The Illustrious) by the Syrians because when a usurper seized control of the
government he showed himself to be a true king.25 The literal translation of Epiphanes is God

21

Mørkholm, 37.
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24
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Manifest, which can be accredited to the concept of the royal cult established by his father,
Antiochus III26. Early in his reign there was some contestation of the throne. There was an
opposition that believed Demetrius was the rightful heir; however, Demetrius was a prisoner in
Rome at the time. Antiochus IV had to manage the political sphere in Antioch to help solidify his
position as king. In order to aid in his goal, Antiochus IV had coins minted bearing his image on
the obverse.27 Through the progression of Antiochus IV’s ascension it can be seen that the
change of power in the Seleucid Empire was contested, but was still successful without largescale civil war or discontent. This is important in assessing the state of the Seleucid Empire, as in
later years there will be greater discontent and internal strife that will help in the decline of the
empire.
One situation that arose upon Antiochus’s arrival in Antioch offers insight into the new
king’s efforts to stabilize the Seleucid Empire. When he arrived, with the army provided to him
by Pergamum, he made an agreement with the young Antiochus where Antiochus IV would
adopt him and make him his co-regent, attempting to prevent as much backlash to his ascension
to the throne as possible. The story also suggests that Antiochus IV married the widow of
Seleucus IV and father of young Antiochus, although this aspect is controversial as it might have
just been a coincidence that both the widow of Seleucus IV and the wife of Antiochus IV had the
same name. Either way these political moves helped to legitimize his reign and bring those who
opposed him under his control.28 This story of Antiochus IV political alignment within the ruling

26
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family as to increase his legitimacy for the throne lends to the concept that Antiochus IV was
very intelligent and politically minded enough to know how to transition into the position of
power without causing mass chaos and civil unrest, a characteristic that would be needed to
rebuild and expand the Seleucid Empire both internally and externally.
Antiochus IV relations with the Greek world also strengthened his power and control
during his reign and demonstrated his goal of stabilizing the Seleucid Empire after the decline as
a result of the Treaty of Apamea. He secured a good relationship with the Achaean League and
throughout Greece as can be seen in Polybius, who was not a supporter of the Syrian power, by
claiming that the “liberality of the present king [Antiochus IV] was well known in Greece.”29
The liberality mentioned in Polybius is expressed in more detail through Livy’s account of the
king. For example, Antiochus IV promised to enclose the city of Megalopolis with a wall and put
forth most of the money to do so. In Tegea, he created a large theater made of marble.30 In
addition, in Athens he attempted to complete the temple of Zeus Olympius, which had sat
unfinished for centuries.31 Livy also acknowledges that he gave many gifts to other Greek states,
including Rhodes. The alliance between Antiochus IV and Rhodes would become instrumental
due to the Rhodian navy and the depleted state of Antiochus IV’s navy after the Treaty of
Apamea. Although Livy questions Antiochus IV ability and focus as a ruler, he does give the
concession that “in two great and important respects his soul was truly royal, in his benefactions
to cities and in the honours paid to the gods.”32 Antiochus IV strong connection with the Greek
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world was a key political move to gain patronage, but also one to acquire more prestige for him
and his empire.

Early Diplomacy with Rome
From the early years of his life, Antiochus IV was involved in Roman diplomacy. As a
term of the Treaty of Apamea, he was taken to Rome as a prisoner. In 175 B.C. he was released
in exchange for the son of Seleucus IV, Demetrius I. Later, in the period after his ascension to
the throne, Antiochus IV had to navigate many early diplomatic issues with Rome in order to
maintain and expand his influence, while not upsetting the growing power in the Mediterranean.
In 174 B.C. an embassy from Rome arrived in Antioch. It is unknown if the nature of this
visit was just a formality, as Antiochus IV had recently become king, or if it was to get the
Syrians stance on the Macedonian question before the beginning of the Third Macedonian War.
Rome was trying to isolate Macedonia during this time as it waged a war against them.33
Mørkholm argues that it could be possible that it was sent to ask the Syrians what their feelings
were on the Macedonian question, as Antiochus IV had risen to the position of power in a vast
and wealthy empire.34 Antiochus IV had risen to the position with less legitimacy than the son of
Seleucus IV, Demetrius I, and these interactions with Rome helped to legitimize his reign and
show his political knowledge through siding with the Romans and staying out of the war in
Macedonia, gaining their favor.

33

Mørkholm, 64; Livy XLII: 6.
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In the next year, 173 B.C., Antiochus IV sent his first ambassadors to Rome.35 It is
suggested that this envoy also carried the final installment of the indemnity owed to Rome
according to the Treaty of Apamea.36 This would suggest that the economy in the Seleucid
Empire was stable enough to come up with this large sum of money while maintaining its own
economy and beginning to make preparations for a war in the south against the Ptolemaic
Empire, even after the loss at Magnesia. The Seleucid envoy requested friendship with Rome and
Rome accepted.37 It should be noted again; however, that Rome was on the verge of war with
Macedonia and needed the Seleucid’s alliance in order to ensure they did not hold any allegiance
to Macedonia and become an enemy. At the end of the conflict in Macedonia the relationship
between the Romans and the Seleucids would change and the dominant power of the Romans in
the Mediterranean world becomes more apparent38.
What this early interaction between the new king of the Seleucid Empire and Rome
shows is Antiochus IV’s efforts to advance the Seleucid Empire and knowing that he must play
the political game with Rome in order to be able to do the things he will later do. His political
abilities to befriend the power of Rome shows his knowledge of politics and how to promote
himself and the empire to aid in its recovery from the terms of the Treaty of Apamea.39 These
early contacts will aid in his relationship with Rome that will make Rome more lenient on some
of the other terms of the treaty later in his reign, an aspect of the relationship between the Roman

35
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Empire and the Seleucid Empire that will deteriorate under the immediate successors of
Antiochus IV.

The Sixth Syrian War
As previously mentioned, the Seleucid and the Ptolemaic empires became allies after the
marriage of Antiochus III’s daughter to Ptolemy V.40 This was not the first interaction between
the two empires, as they had vacillated between confrontation and alliance since their inception.
After Ptolemy V was murdered in 180 B.C., Antiochus IV sister became regent to her son
Ptolemy VI.41 When Antiochus IV’s sister died in 176 B.C., Ptolemy VI was still a minor and
two regents aided in his rule. According to Polybius, the regents expressed that the Coele-Syria
lands were a part of the dowry when Cleopatra Syria was married to Ptolemy V, an agreement
that Antiochus IV denied ever occurred.42 The two regents then promoted war to their people,
declaring that it would be a short and victorious war that would include the surrender of not only
Antiochus IV’s territory on the borders of Egypt but the whole Seleucid Empire.43 This was the
rhetoric for the beginning of the Sixth Syrian War (170-168 B.C.), but it was also an important
opportunity for Antiochus IV to secure and emphasize his control over the Greek communities
west of the Euphrates to prevent rebellion.44
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Egypt had already begun making war preparations. The celebration of the coming of age
for Ptolemy VI marked an opportunity for Egypt to rekindle alliances, most notably with Rome,
that would aid in their war effort against the Seleucid Empire.45 At the same time a Syrian
embassy, headed by Meleager, was sent to Rome as well to go before the Senate and address the
aggressive Egyptian policy.46 The Senate, however, would not hear the pleas of either embassy
until after the war had begun across the Mediterranean.47
The regents of the young Ptolemaic king, Eulaeus and Lenaeus, set out towards the
Syrian lands without the king, but brought with them a large amount of the kingdoms treasury in
an attempt to bribe Antiochus IV’s officers to surrender their cities.48 To their dismay, however,
Antiochus IV was prepared for war as well and first met the Ptolemaic army on Egyptian soil at
Pelusium, where he was victorious.49 Therefore, Antiochus IV invaded Egypt to begin the Sixth
Syrian War; however, it was in response to Egyptian aggressions and mobilization. Antiochus IV
won the battle and showed mercy on the defeated by sparing the lives of Egyptian soldiers. 50 It is
argued by some that this was a sign of a politically minded Antiochus IV and his “mildness”
would contribute to his later victories in Egypt.51
After a short armistice and change of political leadership in Egypt, the regents were
condemned and replaced. Antiochus IV took over a fortress at Pelusium.52 This began his march
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to Alexandria and the setting of another vitally important political move. Antiochus IV was in a
dominant position as his army marched toward Alexandria. A Greek envoy, which had been in
Alexandria, came to meet with the Seleucid king. Antiochus IV welcomed the men courteously
and through a banquet that night where he heard the men give speeches in defense of Ptolemy
VI, in which most of them placed the blame of the aggressions on the corrupt and now removed
regents. Antiochus IV then began to speak. He acknowledged their points and brought up the
acquisition of the Coele-Syria, denying the claim that it was promised as a dowry to Ptolemy V,
but put off any decision on the subject.53 In the meantime he advanced his army to the city of
Naucratis.54 It is at this point that there is a gap in the historical texts. There is debate over
whether Antiochus IV was crowned king of parts of Egypt in 169 B.C. Regardless, Antiochus IV
gained relative control over Egyptian policy. He was able to show his power and successes
through his military and political actions while courting Greek emissaries and gaining allies at
the same time.55
Up until this point Antiochus IV seems to have had complete victory in Egypt. He was
able to reassert the Seleucid military as a successful force and essentially take control of parts of
Egypt without officially annexing it, which would have upset the powers in Greece and Rome.
The political powers in Egypt, however, would soon change his position. Government leaders in
Egypt established a new government to overthrow the government of Ptolemy VI. Cleopatra II
and her brother, the younger Ptolemy, became joint rulers and appealed to Rome for aid against
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Antiochus IV.56 He, in turn, portrayed himself as the defender of the legitimate government in
Egypt and marched from Memphis to Alexandria. This was enough to catch the attention of
Rome, but not their military intervention. Rome was still in the middle of a conflict in Macedon.
Polybius suggests that the Romans feared that Antiochus IV’s conquest of Alexandria would
make him a threat to Rome, and sent an envoy from Rhodes to put an end to the conflict.57 The
Roman leadership did not see the need for direct military intervention in Egypt at the time.58
The Romans entrust the Rhodians to conduct some kind of peace in the Syrian-Egyptian
conflict.59 Their intervention, though, would not matter. Antiochus IV was unsuccessful in his
siege of Alexandria. When the Rhodian envoy arrived in his camp, he cut them off and denied
the legitimacy of Cleopatra II and the younger Ptolemy. Antiochus failed in his goal of
conquering Alexandria; however, he maintained his political prestige through sending gifts to
both Greek cities and Rome amounting to one hundred and fifty talents combined.60 In the Fall
of 169 B.C. Antiochus returned to Syria with his army, leaving a garrison at Pelusium and
Ptolemy VI in Memphis.61
Antiochus IV launched a new expedition into Egypt in the spring of 168 B.C.62 Through
a naval attack, he successfully brought Cyprus under his control, thus asserting the resurgence of
the Seleucid naval power for the first time since its decommission through the terms of

56

Livy XLIV: 19, 6-8.
Polybius, XXVIII: 17, 4-9.
58
Günther Hölbl, A History of the Ptolemaic Empire (New York: Routledge, 2001), 147.
59
Polybius, XXVIII: 17, 13-15.
60
Polybius XXVIII: 22-23.
61
Mørkholm, 86-87.
62
Polybius XXIX: 26-27.
57

15

Apamea.63 He then turned his attention to Egypt. How he took control in Egypt for the second
time is debated, but regardless he was able to re-acquire much of the territory he occupied the
year before. This shows his power and military might in the region and the sustainability of his
military force as well as the weakness of Ptolemy VI. This set Antiochus IV on the second
approach of Alexandria. His military force, however, would not be tested for a second time as
Rome became aware of the resurgence of Seleucid power in Egypt.
The Romans, coming off a victory at Pydna over Perseus of Macedon, could now change
their focus to Antiochus IV’s advancements into Egypt. C. Popilius Laenas was stationed on the
Island of Delos, and once hearing word of the success in Macedon, began Rome’s intervention in
the Egyptian conflict. In July of 168 B.C. the Roman embassy arrived to meet with Antiochus
just outside of Alexandria. It was there in the city of Eleusis that ‘the day of Eleusis’ occurred
that would change the course of Antiochus IV’s expedition into Egypt.
Rome needed to reaffirm its strength in the area as Sherwin-White and Kuhrt claim, “It
was obviously in Rome’s current interests to shore up a tottering Egyptian regime against this
most dangerous and powerful eastern empire.”64 The Egyptian regime was in disarray and the
Seleucids looked strong and powerful to the Romans watching from afar. With Rome’s conquest
in Macedonia concluded, she turned to Laenas and his envoy into the Seleucid camp to help
bring an end to the Seleucid expansion into Egypt.
Antiochus IV, preparing for the siege of Alexandria, was camped in Eleusis when the
Roman envoy arrived. As Antiochus IV reached out to greet the envoy, Laenas presented him
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with a senatus consultum ordering him to conclude his campaign into Egypt and return to Syria
giving all acquired lands back to the Ptolemaic king.65 In doing so Laenas prevented himself
from grasping Antiochus IV hand until he knew if he was a friend or a foe.66 When the Seleucid
King said that he needed time to consult with is advisors, Laenas drew a circle in the sand around
him and said, “before you step out of this circle give me an answer which I may take back to the
Senate.”67 After moments of silence, knowing the strength of Rome through their recent success
in Macedonia, Antiochus IV had no other viable option than to accept the Roman demands.68 He
removed his troops from Egypt a few days later. The Romans successfully defused the Seleucid
Empire’s expansion into Egypt and restored Ptolemaic rule.69 Even though Antiochus IV did not
successfully take Alexandria or maintain control of Egypt, the Sixth Syrian War shows the
strength of the Seleucid military after Apamea, being successful in battle on two expeditions into
Egypt on land and sea.
The southern expedition of Antiochus IV in the Sixth Syrian War shows not only the
military strength, but also the political abilities of Antiochus IV. He was able to fortify the
southern border and establish stronger relationships and a stronger presence with the Greek
communities there and portray strength to others throughout the empire to help deter other
communities from rebelling. He was able, through political conversations with Rome, to
maintain his military force after the Day of Elusis, even though parts of his military force went
against the terms of the Treaty of Apamea. The acceptance of the Roman decree lost the
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Seleucids Egyptian territory and some prestige, but they maintained their power in other areas
through diplomatic means with Rome and the Greek communities that Antiochus IV came into
contact with through his expedition south.

The Maccabean Rebellion
Although the expedition into Egypt took a large portion of Antiochus’s attention, it was
not the only issue requiring it in the south. The Seleucid Empire was vast, at this point stretching
from the Mediterranean to the Far East, and although the royal family and many communities
were Hellenistic, the empire contained many cultures that were not. In order to function properly
as a society the Seleucid kings had to be able to balance the Hellenized culture of its leadership
with the different cultures under their control, similarly to what the Romans were doing
throughout Europe. One of the best examples of the conflicts that the Hellenistic kings had was
the struggle between Hellenism and Judaism, which one historian claims to be the birth of
religious persecution.70
The Maccabean rebellion that would come in 167 B.C. was part the struggle between
traditionalists and those in favor of a more Hellenized Jerusalem. Their homeland had switched
hands between the Ptolemaic Empire and the Seleucid Empire several times, most recently
becoming a part of the Seleucid Empire under Antiochus III in 200 B.C.71 A few decades later, in
170 B.C., Antiochus IV granted Jerusalem the title of Greek polis upon the request of some of
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the city elites, led by the brother of the high priest Onais III, Jason.72 As with any change, this
incurred backlash within certain Jewish groups who wished to hold on to the traditional aspects
of the religion. This difference of opinion on the ability of traditionalist Jews to practice their
faith the way they believed it should be practiced would bring them into conflict with the
Hellenistic king and government in Jerusalem who now had Hellenistic leniencies.
The Hellenization of Jerusalem was part of Antiochus’s efforts to further integrate the
non-Greek communities into the Seleucid Empire in order to help prevent further rebellions. This
process was highly successful in some areas of the Empire; however, that would not be the case
in Jerusalem. There were several groups who did not agree with the Hellenization and wished to
maintain a more traditional society. 73 This led to a divide within the community between those
who supported Hellenism in the area and those who did not.74 The act of Antiochus IV’s
predecessor, Seleucus IV, of raiding the temple in Jerusalem could also have hindered the
relations between Antiochus IV and the people of Jerusalem. 75 With the understanding of this
disconnect between the king and the people of Jerusalem it is important to understand that the
conflict between the two groups was minimal in 170 B.C. and would not raise to the point of
rebellion until several years later in response the decrees of Antiochus IV in 167 B.C.
The conflict continued prior to Antiochus’s 169 B.C. expedition in Egypt, when he
sacked the temple in Judaea with the consent of the new High Priest Menelaus, whom Antiochus
IV had assigned to the position because of his Hellenistic sympathies. Through the sacking of the

72

Andrade, 56; Thomas Horn, trans. 1 and 2 Maccabees (Crane, MO: Defender Publishing), 2 Maccabees
4:4-15; Habicht, 199.
73
Andrade, 59.
74
Ibid., 56.
75
2 Maccabees 3:11; Mørkholm, 136.

19

temple he gained 1,800 talents and further upset many who lived in Jerusalem.76 He also killed
many of Menelaus’ political opponents while in the city.77 This interaction between Antiochus
IV and the Jewish population of Jerusalem marks one of the first direct conflicts between the two
powers and a prelude to what would happen in the years to come. Prior to this interaction the
Seleucid intervention of the South was mostly concerned with the debate over whether the region
belonged to the Ptolemaic Empire or the Seleucid Empire and little attention was given to
Jerusalem and the discontent within; however, that would all change two years later.
Just two years later in 168/167 B.C., Antiochus increased his direct intervention in the
area and set into motion a series of decrees that would bring him into direct conflict with some of
his Jewish citizens.78 Observing the Sabbath, performing circumcisions, and being in possession
of the Torah and practicing its laws were punishable by crucifixion or hanging.79 In addition,
Seleucid forces, led by Apollonius, attacked the city of Jerusalem, killing many.80 They
desecrated the temple, stripping it of all valuable items, including the gold decorations, and
leaving it bare.81 The Temple of Zion was then renamed for Jupiter Olympus and the Jews were
forced to participate in a procession honoring the god Dionysus.82 Antiochus’s treatment of the
Jews through these decrees and actions has led him to be called “The historic prototype of the
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antichrist myth,” by one historian.83 The exact reasoning for Antiochus’s decrees in Jerusalem is
unknown, as he does not treat other ethnic groups throughout the empire with such scrutiny. The
opinion of many is that these decrees were most likely created in an effort to Hellenize the
Jewish population, as a part of Antiochus’s attempts to bring the people in his empire closer to
the king.84
In order to further Jewish Hellenization, Antiochus required that all Jews worship the
Greek gods and had altars erected in every community.85 The sacrifices were to occur once a
month on the date of Antiochus IV’s birthday.86 According to 1 Maccabees there were many in
Judea who gladly adopted the king’s decrees.87 These sacrifices, however, involved animals that
Jews believed to be unclean and there was a growing population that was dissatisfied.
Many may have “gladly adopted” the decrees of Antiochus IV, however, there were those
who resisted the demands of the king are that resistance evolved into the Maccabean rebellion.
The Maccabean Rebellion began with Mattathias’s act in Modein in early 166 B.C. Mattathias
was a priest in his community and was appalled by the changing conditions of Jerusalem saying,
“Alas! Why was I born to see this, the ruin of my people, the ruin of the holy city, and to dwell
there when it was given over to the enemy, the sanctuary given over to aliens?”88 When the
king’s officials, led by Apelles, came to Modein to enforce the sacrifices, Mattathias, being a
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prominent figure in the community, was called upon to be the first to do so.89 Mattathias refused,
claiming, “I [Mattathias] and my sons and my brothers will live by the covenant of our
fathers.”90 He then killed the Seleucid officials, a man who attempted to perform the sacrifice
once Mattathias refused, and destroyed the altar, thus beginning the Maccabean Rebellion.91
Shortly after, groups of men, women and children who had fled the cities and were hiding
in caves were discovered by Seleucid troops. The Seleucid forces first offered for the Jews to
repent.92 They refused, and the Seleucid forces attacked. The Jews refused to fight back because
it was the Sabbath and were slaughtered. Upon hearing of this horrific episode, Mattathias
declared that they would not refuse to fight and that they would “fight against every man who
comes to attack us on the Sabbath day.”93 His movement grew as fugitives and warriors alike
gathered to support him.94 What began as one man’s refusal to follow the decrees and demands
set forth by Antiochus IV evolved into an organized movement with a united goal that threatened
the authority of the Seleucid king.
Why would Antiochus IV put forth such dramatic changes and bring on conflict and
discontent within his empire? Prior to him, the Seleucid kings believed in religious tolerance and
promoted the practices of other religions within their empire.95 Even Antiochus followed this
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pattern in other areas of the Empire. Bickerman calls the persecution of the Jews by Antiochus
IV “the basic and sole enigma in the history of Seleucid Jerusalem.”96
There are many theories from ancient and modern scholars ranging from mental illness to
the manipulation of Antiochus IV by Jewish reformers.97 Based on the information available, the
most probable reason for his decision was an attempt of Antiochus to Hellenize his empire that
encompassed so many different cultures and religions in order to connect them better with the
Seleucid government. With the vast Seleucid Empire and the discontent between some cultural
groups Antiochus needed a way to unite them and Hellenization served as his catalyst. The more
important issue to discuss, however, is not the act, but the repercussions. The way in which
Antiochus IV and his successors would address the conflict between Hellenism and Judaism,
helps to demonstrate their ability, or inability, to maintain order and stability within their
territory. The way Antiochus and the governing body of the Seleucid Empire handled the issue
showed their ability to rule over the far reaches of their empire and would illuminate how their
government handled complications from internal strife.
Mattathias died in late 166 B.C and left control of his movement to one of his five sons
Judas, who was called Maccabeus, the origination of the term Maccabees.98 For several years the
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Maccabees, led by Judas, successfully waged guerrilla style warfare.99 This was only a small
rebellion in a small area of the vast Seleucid Empire; therefore, it did not warrant the attention of
the king, as small rebellions would rise and fall on their own from time to time. The Maccabean
cause gained popularity and their numbers grew as they raided the countryside, staying clear of
the walled cities.100 The small forces organized by the local officials and elite in Jerusalem
attempted to bring an end to the rebellion; however, time after time the Maccabees were
victorious.101
By fall 165 B.C., Judas and the Maccabean force had caused enough destruction within
Judea to warrant the attention of the king. The Maccabees gained control of the road between
Jerusalem and Jaffa, essentially cutting off the city from the King.102 The Maccabees were
undermining the Seleucid authority in the area through their successful guerrilla warfare.
Antiochus was forced to take the Maccabees seriously and mobilize forces into the area;
however, at that time he was on campaign in the East with the main army solidifying Seleucid
dominance in areas that had rebelled under earlier kings.
Antiochus named Lysias as the general in charge of a newly formed, large Seleucid force
responsible for putting down the Maccabean rebellion.103 According to 1 Maccabees the forces
attacked and were repeatedly repelled by the Maccabees.104 On the contrary, Bickerman claims
that other sources show there was more political negotiation between Lysias and the Maccabees,
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where Lysias agreed to be the speak to the king about the demands of the Maccabees in return
for their “good will towards the state.”105 Either way, the Seleucid king knew that a decision
needed to be made. The campaign in the East was costly and he needed the internal issues in the
south to be resolved quickly. Through negotiations, aided by a Roman envoy and Menelaus, the
officiating high priest of the reform party, the king and the Jews came to an agreement where the
king would revoke the persecutions and grant amnesty to all who returned to their homes by
March 29, 164 B.C., thus hypothetically ending the conflict between the Seleucid rulers and the
Maccabees. The Maccabees, however, were still discontent that Menelaus and the reform party
stood in a place of power and would take to action once again in later in 164 B.C.106
In an attempt to eradicate the reform party from Jerusalem, Judas and his followers once
again went on the offensive, this time attacking Jerusalem itself.107 Once in control of the city,
Judas had two initial goals: purify the temple and offer the appointed sacrifices.108 It had been
exactly three years since the first pagan sacrifice was made that the Maccabees put forth their
“purification.”109 In response to these aggressions, Lysias was once again sent with an army to
subdue the Maccabees. After a victorious battle at Beth Zur, Lysias moved further into
Maccabean territory and began a siege of Jerusalem.110
It was at this point that a series of unexpected events took place to change the relationship
between the Seleucid government and the Maccabees. First, in 164 B.C. Antiochus died while on
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campaign in the East, thus leaving control of the kingdom to his son Antiochus V. He was only
nine years old; thus, prior to leaving on the eastern expedition, Antiochus IV named Lysias as the
guardian of the young king.111 Complicating the issue more, Antiochus IV, on his deathbed,
named a different general, Philip, to be the guardian of Antiochus V.112
Once Antiochus V was named king, he and Lysias rode south with an army to handle the
Maccabean issue, once again laying siege to Jerusalem. Upon receiving word that Philip was
returning from the East with his army to take control in Antioch, Lysias and Antiochus V had to
make a decision regarding the importance of the siege of Jerusalem versus losing control in
Antioch. In 163 B.C. Antiochus V promised to end all persecutions of the Jews and give them
the control over their laws that they had prior to Antiochus IV’s reign.113 With this decision the
rebellion of the Maccabees ended for the short term and order in the area was temporarily
restored.
This conflict in the history of the Seleucid Empire is one that gets much attention for the
religious persecution of the Jews, but is rarely addressed in the larger discussion of the evolution
of the Seleucid Empire. The reason Antiochus IV deliberately antagonized his Jewish population
is highly debated and truly unknown; however, the way in which he handled the issue as it
escalated to the point of rebellion that challenged the kings authority in the area is more
important to understanding the stability and functionality of the Seleucid Empire under his
leadership. First, there was enough organization within the empire to coordinate and administrate
the implementation of the decrees themselves. This situation does show the function and
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effectiveness of Antiochus IV’s government and the Seleucid Empire. Antiochus IV appointed
inspectors to observe the changes taking place and ensure that sacrifices were being conducted
according to the decrees showing that there were limitations to the autonomy given by the
Seleucid king to local communities throughout the empire.114 Also, once the rebellion began the
Seleucid powers were able to raise, organize, and coordinate a large army, while the main forces
were on campaign in the East, and defeat the Maccabean rebels. This shows both the proficiency
of the government and the financial stability to construct a second large military force.
Finally, the granting of amnesty by both Antiochus IV and Antiochus V shows the
leaderships acknowledgment of the larger issues of the empire and the understanding that there
were more important and costly ventures to handle and that the implementation of restrictions on
the Jewish population was costly and not as important as the other external stresses on the
empire. After the death of Antiochus IV, his successor, Antiochus V, needed stability in the
empire, as he had to defend his claim to the throne at the same time, and the granting of Amnesty
and revocation of the decrees of his father aided him in his effort. He solved the problem for the
short term. However, as definitive as the giving of amnesty was to deciding the fate of the
conflict, it was not the end of the struggle between Hellenism and Judaism. Later kings of the
Seleucid Empire had to confront the conflict as well.

Southern Deterioration under Later Kings
The reign of Antiochus IV was the greatest example of the ability of the Seleucid Empire
to recover and expand its power and influence after the loss of Antiochus III and the

114

1 Maccabees 1 - 51.

27

implementation of the Treaty of Apamea. His successors attempted to continue the tradition. Due
to internal and external conflict, however, the empire began to slowly degrade until its demise at
the hands of Pompey in 64 B.C. The southern border as well as the conflicts with the Maccabees
illustrates part of the decline that would consume the Seleucid Empire in the years between the
death of Antiochus IV in 164 B.C. and the arrival of Pompey in 64 B.C. After the death of
Antiochus IV, Antiochus V granted amnesty to the Maccabees and others and recanted the
decrees of his father hoping that it would bring an end to the rebellion. The leadership of the
Seleucid Empire hoped the Maccabean problem was solved. However, the conflict did not go
away. In addition, the rivalry with the Ptolemaic Empire that had existed almost as long as both
empires continued to require the attention of later Seleucid kings.
In 152 B.C. a Usurper named Alexander Balas, claiming to be the son of Antiochus IV,
landed in Ptolemais and began to make his way to Antioch to gain control of the Seleucid
Empire, continuing a period of severe internal conflict over the succession of the Seleucid
Empire that had started with the death of Antiochus IV and that would last almost until Pompey
arrived in Antioch.115 The Maccabees were still a powerful force during this period as both
Alexander Balas and Demetrius I would fight for their allegiance in the civil war. 116 Balas
named Jonathan, the successor of Judas, to the position of High priest in an effort to gain his
allegiance. 117 Upon hearing of Balas’ deal with Jonathan Demetrius I made his own appeal
claiming “I will free you from the greatest part of the tributes and taxes which you formerly paid
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to the kings my predecessors, and to myself.”118 However the Jews did not trust Demetrius I, and
aided Alexander Balas in his rise to the throne where they defeated and killed Demetrius I in 150
B.C. The throne of the Seleucid Empire was reinstated to the rightful heir, Demetrius II, from
Balsa in 147 B.C. with the aid of King Ptolemy VI of Egypt.119 After the successful invasion,
Ptolemy VI was in position to take control of all of Syria, but refused the throne of the Seleucid
Empire, knowing Rome would not approve of a unified Hellenistic world and promoted
Demetrius II as king, although it was clear that Ptolemy VI was in charge.120 Ptolemy VI was
mortally wounded in the Battle of Antioch in 145 B.C., leaving his troops to march back to
Egypt leaderless leaving Syria back in the hands of the Seleucid king by default and not military
or political action achieved by Demetrius II showing the dominance of the Ptolemaic Empire in
the ongoing rivalry between the two empires.
The Seleucid Empire had to continually fight for the contested border between the
Seleucid Empire and the Ptolemaic Empire. After the death of Antiochus VII in 129 B.C.
Demetrius II regained control of the Seleucid Empire after being taken prisoner by the Parthians
in 139 B.C.121 At the same time the Ptolemaic Empire was undergoing a civil war in which the
king, Ptolemy VIII, was kicked out of the country and attempted to come back and regain control
from his wife Cleopatra II.122 Cleopatra II offered Demetrius II the Egyptian throne in exchange
for his aid in their civil war.123 However, the strength of the Seleucid military at the time was
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minimal and the Seleucid forces were not able to make it past the border stronghold of Pelusion,
where Demetrius II’s troops revolted and joined Ptolemy VIII Showing the lack of strength and
loyalty Demetrius had from his troops.124
Ptolemy VIII decided then to use the weakness of the Seleucid Empire at this time
against them. He arranged a revolt in the city of Antioch, and soon after other Syrian cities began
to revolt as well. In 126 B.C., he sent a large army led by Alexander Zambians, whom Ptolemy
VIII appointed as the rival to Demetrius II, to destroy Demetrius II’s forces.125 Demetrius II was
defeated by the Egyptian army at Damascus, and soon after he was murdered, thus ending any
support Cleopatra II hoped to gain from the Seleucid Empire in the Egyptian civil war and
proved once again the weakness of the Seleucid Empire at this point in its history. 126 It also aids
in the argument that the empire was in decline after the death of Antiochus IV because they
could not protect their own capital from being overrun by the Egyptians and a usurper put into
power.
These examples of military and political situations the Seleucid Empire found itself in
after the death of Antiochus IV show the decline of the Empire as a whole. Its inability to build a
successful army to fight in Egypt and maintain holdings in Judea shows that the central
government of the Seleucid Empire held very little to no power over the southern region of the
empire in the years after the death of Antiochus IV.
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Conclusion: The Southern Powers
Regardless of the losses from the Treaty of Apamea, the Seleucid Empire still had vast
territory, gained under Antiochus III, which had to be effectively ruled in the. To the South, the
land between the Seleucid Empire and the Ptolemaic Empire was one of the new lands now
under Seleucid control and had to be brought into the political system. The issues in the south
encompassed many years of Antiochus IV’s reign. His domestic and foreign policy in this region
showed how the Seleucid Empire was attempting to expand its influence and stabilize its position
with the Greek communities in the South and Greece.
What can be seen from the Sixth Syrian War is the resurgence of the Seleucid Empire
after the loss at Magnesia both militarily and economically. There is no doubt that the Seleucids
were not strong enough to fight Rome, but they were prominent enough in the Hellenistic World
to show their power and extend their presence throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, whether it
be through warfare or diplomacy. It can also be seen that even after the massive loss of troops at
the Battle of Magnesia the Seleucid Empire was able to rebuild its army and navy and be
victorious with both. This shows an ability of Antiochus IV to govern his territory sufficiently
that he was able to establish a new fighting force, organize them into a military force that was
sufficient in size and ability, and then sustain this force over the course of several years as they
would go on an expedition in the East after the conclusion of the Sixth Syrian War. This shows
the continuation of the power of the Seleucid Empire and that it was not in a state of decline
during the reign of Antiochus IV.
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The Maccabean Rebellion shows a flaw in Antiochus IV’s rule, but it also sheds light on
the functionality of government under the Seleucid King. The ability for Antiochus IV to raise a
second army under the generalship of Lysias also shows the stability and wealth of the empire to
be able to function two armies simultaneously. In the end, the decline seen before and after
Antiochus IV’s reign overshadowed his advancements towards stability in the Seleucid Empire
that is very important to its history.
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Chapter 2: Taking Back the Rebellious East
Under Antiochus I and Antiochus III, the borders of the Seleucid Empire were expanded
from Greece to India. This vast territory required the kings of the Seleucid Empire to be able to
maintain order and to control many different ethnicities and cultures. Most Seleucid kings
accomplished this by giving a level of autonomy to each individual community. Some of the
conquered areas, mainly in the Far East, resisted incorporation into the Seleucid Empire, and
were constantly waiting for opportunities to rebel and to break away from the Seleucid Empire.
The Treaty of Apamea gave the disgruntled regions, such as Parthia, Bactria, Armenia, and
Media the opportunity to break away from the weakened state of the Seleucid Empire.127 The
inactivity of Antiochus III’s successor, Seleucus IV, left it to Antiochus IV to regain control of
the lost territories.

The Seleucid East Prior to Antiochus IV
With the death of Alexander the Great, the vast lands that he had conquered fought for
dominance and divided into four regions, the Ptolemaic Kingdom, the Seleucid Empire,
Macedon, and later the Kingdom of Pergamum, the largest being the Seleucid Empire. The new
empire would come to contain many of the territories conquered by Alexander the Great,
including the satrapies in the East of Parthia and Bactria during the reigns of the first two kings.
Around the middle of the third century B.C. the Seleucid Empire were fighting in the
Third Syrian War (246-241 B.C.) with Ptolemaic Egypt.128 With the troops being consolidated in
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the West, the North Eastern border of the Seleucid Empire, the satrapies of Parthia and Bactria,
became vulnerable to nomad invasions from Central Asia.129 This led to tensions between the
locals in the East and the Seleucid government as their troops and resources were being used to
fight the war with Egypt, while nomads from Central Asia were raiding their lands.130 It appears
that the early focus of the Seleucid rule in the East was to ensure the protection of the trade and
communications routs in the East and they had little interest in the outer edges of the eastern
satrapies.131 The Seleucid neglect also led to the invasion and establishment of the Arsacid
dynasty (247 B.C. – 224 A.D.) in Parthia.132 Both Parthia and Bactria broke away from the
Seleucid Empire establishing independent rule by the late third Century.133
The Parthians, under the rule of the Arsacids, are most well known for being a strong
rival to the Roman Empire in the first and second centuries. As the nomadic tribes led by the
Arsacids moved into Parthia they challenged the power of the Seleucids and took control of the
area, creating an independent Parthia, taking control from Andragoras who was the Seleucid
satrap Parthia at the time. 134 An agreement between Parthia and Bactria solidified independence
for both powers.135 The conflicts between the Seleucid and Parthian powers would eventually
mark part of the deterioration of the Seleucid Empire and the rise of the Parthians, however,
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under several of the later Seleucid kings, Antiochus III, Antiochus IV, and Antiochus VII the
Seleucid Empire experienced moderate success in the East.
The Arsacids, after establishing rule in Parthia, began to expand their territory. By 209
B.C. Parthia had expanded its territory as far as Ecbatana in Media.136 In an effort to stop their
expansion and the expansion of others, Antiochus III began a series of campaigns to take back all
regions of the Seleucid Empire that rebelled. His goal was to expand the Seleucid Empire’s
borders to that of its founder, Seleucus Nicator. He retook Ecbatana after a long battle, pushing
Arsaces II back.137 Arsaces II eventually surrendered to Antiochus III, bringing the Parthians
back into the Seleucid Empire. With Parthia being brought back under Seleucid control,
Antiochus III forced Euthydemus of Bactria to sign a treaty as well, recognizing Seleucid
control.138 By the time Antiochus III went to war with Rome in 192 B.C. the Seleucid Empire
stretched from India to Thrace.139
Even with his expansive territorial additions to the empire, one decisive battle at the end
of his reign would cost him much of what he gained. The Eastern satraps of Armenia, led by
Artaxias, and Sophene, led by Zariadres, rebelled against the Seleucid’s and named themselves
kings, beginning an independent rules.140 In addition, Bactria and Parthia shows no sign of
Seleucid dependence after 190 B.C. as well.141 Parthia regained a large amount of its territory
that had been lost to Antiochus III during the eastern campaign, and pushed its boundaries into
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Media.142 Bactria’s separation from the Seleucid Empire was simple; Parthia acted as a buffer
between Bactria and the Seleucid Empire allowing them to rebel and not be in fear of Seleucid
invasion. Other areas throughout the East also abandoned the Seleucid Empire in an effort to
create their own independent kingdoms.143 The defection of many eastern satrapies shows the
damage done to the eastern part of the Seleucid Empire as a result of the Treaty of Apamea and
the Battle of Magnesia as they led to a weakened Seleucid Empire and little loyalty existed in the
Far East. Antiochus IV would have to address the lack of influence the king had in the east in
order to stabilize his empire and regain the territory and tax revenues lost through the process.

Parthian Expansion after Antiochus III
Although Antiochus IV never comes into direct conflict with Parthia during his reign he
would have been aware of their growing influence in the East as they continued to expand their
borders. Antiochus III brought the rebellious province back into Seleucid control. Once the
Treaty of Apamea went into effect and the Parthians regained their independence, their presence
continued to hinder the Seleucid Empire as the reign of Antiochus IV went on.
Parthia reasserted its independence from the Seleucid Empire under Phraates I (176-171
B.C.). During his reign, Parthia was able to expand its influence and military presence in the Far
East, as Antiochus IV was occupied with the affairs of his ascension to the throne and the
conflict with the Ptolemaic Empire. In Bactria a Usurper rose to power leading to instability in
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the leadership of Bactria and giving the Parthian ruler the chance to move into areas of Bactria,
which he did claiming many areas of Bactria in 175 B.C.144
After Phraates I’s death in 171 B.C., he was succeeded by his brother, Mithridates I (171
– 138 B.C.), known as Mithridates the Great.145 By 166 B.C. the Parthian Empire was on the rise
once again. Mithridates did not waste any time expanding the Parthian Empire, conquering Hart
by 167 B.C.146 They occupied parts of Media and continued to expand deeper into Seleucid
territory; however Mithridates would not make enough advancements West to gain as much
attention from Antiochus IV as he would later kings when he conquered all of Media in 141
B.C.147 With the leadership of Mithridates I, the power of the Parthians began to rival that of the
Seleucids. What is most interesting about the relationship between Mithridates I and Antiochus
IV is that Mithridates I never made moves deep into Seleucid territory until after Antiochus IV
died. This could be attributed to the strength of the Seleucid Empire that was achieved by
Antiochus IV.148 Parthia’s continued military actions in the East brought the two powers to the
battlefield, however, it would not occur until the reign of Demetrius II in 139 B.C., many years
after the death of Antiochus IV.

The Grand Procession at Daphne: A Prelude to the Eastern Expedition
Enduring the intervention of Romans at Eleusis, the internal rebellion of the Maccabees,
and the loss of territory in the East, the Seleucid king was in desperate need of something
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positive to project the strength of the Seleucid Empire internally and externally. Antiochus IV
had to conduct damage control with both his citizens and the leaders of the Mediterranean world.
Hearing about the grand Roman procession in Macedonia, constructed by Aemillius Paulus,
Antiochus IV organized an event that would surpass that of Paulus and project the grandeur of
the Seleucid Empire.149 He sent envoys to several cities throughout the Hellenistic world to
spread the word and help amplify the impact of the procession outside of the Seleucid Empire.150
The thirty day event at Daphne to honor the god Apollo began in 166/5, historians have
debates its exact date in relation to how it fits into the military campaign due to the lack of
primary source material available at this time. It began with a large procession through the city.
Processions honoring Apollo were not new and were conducted both by Antiochus IV’s
predecessors and his successors; however, the procession of 166 B.C. was larger, both in size
and importance, than any other.151
The public procession began with large groups of armed troops totaling in the tens of
thousands, showing the strength and wealth of the Seleucid Empire. Leading the procession was
five thousand Seleucid troops marching “in the Roman fashion, with their coats made of chain
armour, five thousand in the prime of life.”152 This was Antiochus’s way of exhibiting the newly
reorganized military force of the Seleucid Empire. The Seleucid force was followed by five
thousand Mysians, three thousand Cilicians, three thousand Thracians, five thousand Gauls, and
Twenty thousand Macedonians. Two hundred and forty pairs of gladiators, showing the Roman
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influence on the procession, as well as a few thousand troops from other lands continued the
military segment of the procession.153 At the end of the military procession there were three
chariots, all drawn by several war elephants, and thirty-six war elephants in single file.154 The
presence of the war elephants is important as the Seleucid Empire was banned from having them
through the terms of the Treaty of Apamea. The military force present at Daphne amounted to
over forty thousand infantry and sixty-five hundred cavalry and was a show of power by the
Seleucid king, most likely as a prelude to the eastern expedition Antiochus IV was planning;
however, the military presence was not the end of the procession.155
The first section of the procession displayed the military strength and power of the
Seleucid Empire. The second section would show the wealth and splendor of Antiochus’s
domain. Even Polybius is taken back by the processions stating, “The rest of the procession was
almost beyond description.”156 Polybius tries to express the vast amount of gold and silver
presented at the procession saying, “A thousand boys carried silver vessels, none of which
weighed less than a thousand drachmae (approximately five pounds each).”157 Accompanying
them were over six hundred slaves carrying gold vessels. In addition, there were roughly three
hundred foreign delegates present in the procession. Not only was there a large showing of
military power, but there was an expansive presentation of the wealth of the Seleucid Empire as
well.

153

Polybius XXXI: 3.
Polybius XXXI: 3.
155
G. G. Aperghis, The Seleukid Royal Economy: The Finances and Financial Administration of the
Seleukid Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 191.
156
Polybius XXXI 3.
157
Polybius XXXI 3.
154

39

As Sherwin-White and Kuhrt believe, this event was ‘counter-propaganda’ and a way for
Antiochus to rally support from his client system, while showing off the wealth of the empire to
the Hellenistic world and beyond.158 The event lasted thirty days and continued to portray the
wealth and prestige of the Seleucid Empire throughout.159 The event was a political move of
Antiochus to prove to the world that he was still powerful and emphasize the relationships he had
with other leaders. The inclusion of the three hundred foreign delegates in the procession and the
many envoys sent around the Hellenistic world inviting them to the procession exemplify that
point.
The Grand Procession at Daphne was also a way for Antiochus to show his strength to
Rome. First, the event itself was modeled after one hosted by the Romans, and Antiochus aimed,
successfully, to surpass the procession of Paulus. He also challenged the terms of the Treaty of
Apamea signed by his father. He accomplished this through the use of war elephants in the
military procession. The war elephants were a symbol of Antiochus IV separation from the terms
of the treaty set forth by the Romans and shows the independence and power he had and the
power he had in his part of the world as the Romans would notice, but not take action against
Antiochus. This is also a good measure to understanding the decline of the Seleucid Empire, as
later kings would not have the power to break the terms with such ease.160 The procession at
Daphne is a great example of the propaganda skills of Antiochus as it served as both a
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demonstration of the prestige and power of the Seleucid Empire and as a prelude to the Eastern
expedition that he would embark on shortly after.161
Even with the great advances of the procession and games, there were aspects of the
event that hurt Antiochus IV’s image more than helped it. It is said through several sources that
during the gatherings of the world leaders, Antiochus IV did not act according to what would be
expected from the king-host.162 They were amazed by the greatness of the kingdom shown
through the procession, but also the unacceptable behavior of the king as he rode on an inferior
horse and danced around with the jesters at the feasts.163 Even though this hindered Antiochus
IV’s image, the event as a whole still helped portray the Seleucid Empire as a grand power of the
Hellenistic world, which was needed to portray the strength of the Seleucid Empire after
Antiochus IV was removed from Egypt and as a prelude to the eastern expedition.
Although few historians have discussed the importance of the procession at Daphne, it is
very importance in analyzing the efforts of Antiochus IV to regain the prestige of his father and
establish stability in the empire. The public disregard for the terms of the Treaty of Apamea and
the presentation of the Seleucid Empire as a large, powerful and wealthy power in the
Mediterranean world is a testament to the efforts of Antiochus in preserving and expanding the
power of the Seleucid Empire after the loss at Magnesia. The procession exhibited the changes
that Antiochus IV had made to the Seleucid military, advancements that would be put to the test
on his later expedition in the East. This shows a reflection of what the Seleucid power could be
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and what they wanted the world to see them as. The potential for military and political strength
are both demonstrated through the procession that would be tested in the eastern expedition.
The question remains, were the efforts of the king successful? This is a very difficult
question to answer especially because Antiochus’s death occurred just a short time later. In the
short term, it did have a positive effect on the Seleucid Empire’s power. Just after the event at
Daphne concluded, an envoy sent from Rome arrived in Antioch. It is said that when Tiberius
Gracchus arrived in late 166 B.C. he was treated with such hospitality by Antiochus that it
removed any ideas in his mind that the Seleucid Empire had any ill feelings towards Rome after
the Day of Eleusis that occurred a few years earlier.164 Therefore, from this encounter it can be
seen that Seleucid power still existed in the eyes of the Romans as they had broken several terms
of the treaty of Apamea and yet the Romans were still maintaining friendly relations with the
Seleucid king and not demanding the decommission of the naval and elephant forces. The
procession at Daphne was a prelude to Antiochus IV’s Eastern campaign, therefore it is possible
that the Romans were satisfied with the Seleucids moving their military attentions East instead of
West and did not want to harass them by enforcing the terms that Antiochus was breaking.
Antiochus IV was also able to express Seleucid power to a large number of leaders in the
Hellenistic world through the event.

The Eastern Expedition
Antiochus’s eastern expedition began as an attempt to regain lost satrapies and attempt to
restore part of the Eastern empire. There are many interpretations as to the exact reasoning for
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Antiochus’s Eastern campaign. Some interpretations tend to acknowledge the necessity to
increase the royal influence in some of the Eastern satrapies and reincorporate those lost under
previous kings.165 As previously mentioned, in 167 B.C. Parthia, under the command of
Mithridates I, captured Hart, cutting off the Seleucid trade route to India and severing the
Seleucid King’s connection to the East.166 This would have harmed the trade economy in the
Seleucid Empire greatly. The awareness of the territory lost in the East, as well as the need to
raise funds to fight the war in the South against the Maccabees and pay off war debt from the
Sixth Syrian War, are all possible enticements for the eastern expedition. Once decided on the
eastern expedition, Antiochus IV organized the Procession at Daphne in order to improve the
image of himself and his empire, which, as previously mentioned, acted as his way of showing
the Hellenistic world and Rome that the Seleucid Empire was wealthy and powerful. This
expedition would be Antiochus’s last, but he was still able to reestablish some form of authority
in parts of the East.
There is very little source material on Antiochus IV’s Eastern campaign, which causes a
problem in the exact dating of the location of Antiochus IV at different points in his campaign. In
order to aid in the dating of Antiochus IV’s movements east the use of astronomical diaries as
well as other records is needed to ensure accuracy. “Babylonian astronomical diaries recorded
data drawn from astronomical and other observations concerning the moon, planets, solstices and
equinoxes.”167 Occasionally those who wrote these diaries also noted political, social and

165

Habicht, 202; Mørkholm, 166.
Debevoise, 21.
167
Dov Gera and Wayne Horowitz, “Antiochus IV in Life and Death: Evidence from the Babylonian
Astronomical Diaries,” in Journal of American Oriental Society Vol. 117 No. 2 (1997), 241-42.
166

43

economic occurrences. By combining the dating information from the diaries with the limited
accounts of the Eastern expedition in ancient sources a close to accurate time line of events can
be made. This is the case with some of Antiochus’s eastern movements and allows for a clearer
picture of the series of events that began with the Procession at Daphne and will end with his
death.
Antiochus mobilized his troops and crossed the Euphrates and headed towards the
northern satrapies in the spring of 165 B.C.168 He first marched into Armenia, where King
Artaxias I broke away from the Seleucid Empire to rule independently had amassed an army.169
Very little is known about the war between Antiochus IV and Artaxias I. Diodorus provides only
a fragment of the war discussing Antiochus IV’s victory.170 Antiochus IV’s success is also
mentioned in passing in Appian as well.171 What can be understood by combining the fragments
available is that in roughly 165 B.C., Antiochus marched into Armenia and defeated Artaxias I.
The location of the battle was in what is believed to be the capital of Armenia at the time,
Habigalbat, also known as Armil, located in the vicinity of Lake Van.172 In order to remain in
power Artaxias I was forced to recognize Seleucid authority.173 Not very much is known about
the size and makeup of Artaxias I’s army, although it is possible that the army was very small
after the battle because Antiochus IV would not have left Artaxias I in charge or a force that
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could cause significant damage to the Seleucid Empire after Antiochus’s departure.174 This is an
example of military and political success in the early stages of Antiochus’s eastern campaign to
return the lost satrapies to the Seleucid Empire and raise necessary funds. The next phase of
Antiochus’s eastern campaign took him South to the Persian Gulf. Although there is not a full
account of this move, Pliny the Elder provides some information referring the movements of
Antiochus in Arabia.175 The exact dates of this movement are uncertain. Knowing when
Antiochus IV left for Armenia and where he would be later in 164 B.C. it is a fair guess that he
was in the Persian Gulf region in the fall of 165 B.C. It is believed that Antiochus then
established winter quarters, thus ending the first year of the eastern campaign.
The following and final year of Antiochus’s campaign was 164 B.C., Where he
campaigned in Elymais, in Media. He decided to attack a temple dedicated to the goddess
Nanaia.176 It was a common practice of many of his predecessors to plunder temple communities
in order to raise funds, similarly to what he had done in Jerusalem a few years earlier. The locals
in the area however, gathered together in defense of the temple and it is believed that Antiochus
abandoned his plans to rob the temple prior to coming into actual combat with the locals, the
same locals who had killed his father, Antiochus III, twenty-three years earlier, while on
campaign in the same area.177 In his retreat he moved towards the city of Tabae, in Paraetacene,
between Persis and Media, where he fell ill and died. 178 It is mentioned in an Astronomical diary
that a party escorted a king’s corpse one month after the knowledge of his death had reached
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Babylon; therefore, it is believed that the body was that of Antiochus IV en route back to
Antioch.179
The exact cause of Antiochus’s death is unknown. According to Appian, he died from the
wasting disease.180 Polybius claims that he was driven mad “by some manifestations of divine
wrath in the course of his wicked attempt upon this temple.”181 Second Maccabees claim it was
divine retribution for the sins committed in Jerusalem.182 Whatever the cause may be, the death
of Antiochus IV marks abrupt end to the Eastern campaign and the end of the last great attempt
of a Seleucid king to regain control of the initial borders of the Seleucid Empire. The procession
at Daphne and the eastern expedition after the undesired end of the Sixth Syrian War show that
he was aware of the damage done to his empire by the Romans and needed to quickly recover in
other areas of the empire before the loss resulted in more defections as the loss at Magnesia did
to Antiochus III.183 However his death in 164 B.C. would bring that endeavor to a halt and with
it the end of his efforts toward stability.184

Parthian Expansion after Antiochus IV: How the East was Lost
According to Andrade, “The death of Antiochus IV was a turning point in the rise of
Parthia and the decline of the Seleucid Empire.”185 The increased expansion and strength of the
Parthians after the death of Antiochus IV is possibly one of the largest external forces that aided
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in the decline of the empire. After his death, the Parthians, under Mithridates I, continued to
conquer and expand their territory into the Seleucid Empire with very little resistance, while the
Seleucids were preoccupied with internal strife and continued conflicts in Egypt.
Mithridates I had successfully expanded the reach of the Parthian Empire, again
conquering Media in 148 B.C.186 The Parthians continued on their westward expansion,
conquering Babylonia in 141 B.C., moving further and further west into Seleucid territory with
minimal resistance.187 The lack of resistance could possibly be credited to the internal
deterioration of the line of succession of the Seleucid throne as usurpers as well as battling
family members fought for dominance in Antioch.
With the rise of the usurper Alexander Balas to power in Antioch in 150 B.C., Demetrius
II, son of Demetrius I, had to escape to Crete. Then, in 147 B.C. he returned to Syria and with the
aid of the Ptolemaic Empire and regained the throne in 145 B.C. However, there were still
legitimacy issues with regards to who was the king of the Seleucid Empire as the son of
Alexander Balas, who was only two years old, was being promoted as King Antiochus VI by a
group of unemployed troops, led by Diodotus, whose rise will be discussed more in chapter
three.188
In 139 B.C., Demetrius II was forced to march east to take on Mithridates I due to his
vast expansion and left Antiochus VI to be dealt with later.189 After experiencing a few successes
in battle against small local armies, Demetrius II was defeated and captured by the main Parthian
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force.190 He was then paraded through the satrapies of Parthia.191 Antiochus VII, Demetrius II’s
brother, became aware of Demetrius II’s capture while in Rhodes. He came back to Antioch and
put Diodotus to death, thus taking full control of the empire and pushed forward the goal of
continuing the eastern campaign.192
Antiochus VII attempted to regain the territories in the South and East through a
campaign similar to that of Antiochus III and Antiochus IV. His attempts mark the last partially
successful expedition east against the Parthians. With the death of Diodotus, Antiochus VII’s
popularity grew throughout what remained of the Seleucid Empire to the point of being awarded
the title Megas (The Great) on coinage in the year before his death.193 His decisive battle in
Jerusalem brought an end to the rebellion that began under Antiochus IV by laying siege to
Jerusalem in 135 B.C. for one year and forcing them to terms.194
Antiochus then turned his attention to the growing power of Parthia and the East. In
Parthia, Mithridates I died in 138 B.C. leaving his son, Phraates II, in charge of the now
substantial Parthian territory.195 Antiochus left for his eastern expedition in 131 B.C. and made it
as far as Ekbatana, the chief city in Media, where he would establish his base due to the support
of Greeks in the area.196 He was very successful, winning several battles against Parthian satraps
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and reclaiming Babylonia. According to Appian, Phraates II was afraid of Antiochus VII and
returned Demetrius II back to his brother, in hopes that it would entice civil unrest in the
Seleucid Empire over succession and move its attention away from Parthia.197 It did not work,
and Antiochus VII made winter quarters in parts of Parthia for the winter of 130/129 B.C.
Unfortunately for Antiochus VII, on a selected day the Parthian people revolted against the
military encampments and a large Parthian Army met Antiochus VII on his way to aide one of
them. He was subsequently defeated and killed in 129 B.C. 198As Aperghis writes discussing the
decline of the Seleucid Empire, “The critical moment for the empire, with regards to population,
was not Magnesia and the loss of Asia Minor, but the far more serious loss of Mesopotamia and
the East to the Parthians by 129 B.C.”199 This loss marked the end of the Seleucids eastern
holdings and the end to any real authority held by the king of the rapidly deteriorating Seleucid
Empire.

Conclusion: Antiochus IV and the East
Overall, the East proves to be an area of the Seleucid Empire where consolidation of
power would never fully take effect and where the satrapies would always be waiting to rebel.
The attempts of Antiochus III, Antiochus IV, Demetrius II, and Antiochus VII to regain
territories that had repeatedly rebelled against their rule, some successfully and some not, shows
how difficult it was to conquer and prevent the rebellion of the vastly different and far away
societies of the East.
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More specifically, Antiochus IV’s eastern campaign including the Procession at Daphne
shows his understanding of the political setting of the Hellenistic world and the Seleucid East as
well. He showed once again his understanding of the necessity of positive propaganda,
promoting the Seleucid Empires prestige through grander and military force. Losses on the
battlefield as well as inactivity of previous kings had caused massive deterioration of the
Seleucid Empire; therefore, Antiochus had to rebound after the Day of Eleusis, knowing that this
could be a catalyst for more rebellions, when the Romans had asserted their power once again
over the Seleucid Empire.
Campaigns such as the one conducted by Antiochus III, also brought in large amounts of
needed money as the conflicts between the Seleucids and the Ptolemaic Empire drained the
treasury. Antiochus IV would have known that and it would have played into his decision to
commence the eastern expedition. All in all, Antiochus IV’s decision for an eastern campaign
was a good one. Through the propaganda of the Procession at Daphne he was able to reestablish
his position in the Hellenistic World to the Greek and Roman community, and then through the
subsequent campaign, be able to reassert, at least in part, control in the East. With his untimely
death, all of that effort would be for nothing. It is still a good example of Antiochus IV’s political
abilities and his constant attempts to stabilizing and expanding the prestige of the Seleucid
Empire.

50

Chapter 3: The Strive for Stability
Antiochus IV helped to stabilize the Seleucid Empire and bring it out of the decline that
resulted from the Treaty of Apamea. He then began to reestablish its position and prestige in the
Hellenistic world. The military and political actions in the South and the East show that
Antiochus knew the importance of maintaining his borders in order to aid in the stability of the
empire. In addition, there were many decisions and changes that Antiochus IV made within
Seleucid society that aided in the stability of the empire. When Antiochus ascended to the throne
in 175 B.C., several areas of the Seleucid Empire had rebelled and established independent rule.
The external wars previously mentioned are a great example of Antiochus IV’s efforts to regain
control of lost territory and reinstate prestige and power that would promote stability within the
empire; however, his efforts were not restricted to just these two regions. The ways Antiochus IV
changed internal policy in the Seleucid Empire supports the idea that he was attempting to
encourage stability within the borders of his empire, while promoting it abroad militarily and
politically, which in turn will show that the Seleucid Empire was not in a state of decline during
his reign.

Ethnic Identity in the Seleucid Empire
By the reign of Antiochus IV, the Seleucid Empire encompassed a large amount of
territory with many different ethnicities. Throughout this time the Seleucids had established a
system of rule that maintained the integrity of local cultures in both Greek and non-Greek
communities. There were many different languages and ethnicities throughout the Seleucid
Empire and in an effort to please the communities and maintain order, the Seleucid kings would

51

allow them to maintain their own ethnic identity, but attempt to bring in Hellenistic elements as
well.200 The Greek and Non-Greek communities had distinct characteristics from each other that
led to a less unified people in the Seleucid Empire, which helps to understand the necessity of
Antiochus IV in trying to bring more groups closer to the throne in order to prevent further
rebellions and obtain stability.
From the time of Alexander the Great’s conquest of the East, Greek communities were
established throughout the Seleucid Empire. The influence of Eastern cultures evolved into
Greek communities into communities that were unlike those in Greece or elsewhere in the
Hellenistic world.201 When Macedonian troops stayed behind in the East after their service had
ended, they slowly integrate into the local societies creating an Eastern Greek culture unique to
the Seleucid Empire. One example of Seleucid Hellenization in Greek communities of the
Seleucid Empire can be seen at Marisa in Palestine. Here there are tombs that were created in the
Greek fashion, with niches for the urns of the dead, but also included inscriptions with curses on
it based on local practices.202
Unlike other areas in the Hellenistic world, the East developed into its own kind of
Hellenism. Although the Seleucid Empire was the closest resemblance to Greek Hellenism, due
to the fact that there were many established Greek along the Mediterranean coast of the empire
and established hierarchy communities in the Eastern portion of the Empire, the society differed
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from that of the Greek communities in Greece.203 The establishment of Greek polis throughout
the East occurred from the beginning of the Seleucid era where Greek art and architecture can be
found in the Far East. The concept of bring Greek, however, changed in the Far East, as the
communities were distant from Athens the idea of what Hellenism was became more of a blend
between local and Greek cultures.204 Antiochus IV would use the concepts of Hellenism to
attempt to expand his influence within his borders and establish connections between local elites
and the king of both Hellenized and non-Hellenized communities. Hellenization, at least under
Antiochus IV, was a broad concept that he attempted to use to bring many more communities
closer to the King.205
This led the Seleucids to be disliked by some ancient Greek authors as not being an
authentic Hellenistic society, claiming that they rode elephants, wore Indian unguents, and
feasted immoderately, among other criticisms.206 Therefore, it is important to understand that
Seleucid society was heavily influenced by Hellenism, brought by the Macedonians and
practiced by the Seleucid Kings, but it was not the only aspect of Seleucid culture. There were
many communities, such as temple communities and tribal communities, throughout the Seleucid
Empire that did not show any signs of Hellenization. Therefore, what can be seen is a divide
between the communities that were Hellenized and those that were not, this divide made ruling
the Seleucid Empire difficult as those who were not Hellenized would be have less of a
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connection to the King and be more likely to rebel if given the chance. Antiochus IV understood
this divide and the necessity of integrating more groups and made many strides to bring all
cultural groups together during his reign with some degree of success.
The ethnic identity of the citizens of the Seleucid Empire was highly diverse from the
very beginning, but the kings of the Seleucid Empire were able to maintain stability between the
Greek communities and other communities throughout the empire through various methods,
including patronage and the allowance of local communities to have more autonomy.207 The
patronage seen between Antiochus IV and some of the communities within his empire was a
continuation of what his predecessors had done, giving various gifts including, gold, dates, and
dice.208 Antiochus IV did not patronize Greek communities alone, but also developed close
relations with some eastern communities, giving some the title polis, and others the ability to
mint their own coins.
The instability and loss of control of the late Seleucid Empire is attributed, at least in part,
to the lack of connection between the Seleucid leadership and the Near and Far Eastern
communities.209 Antiochus IV’s realization of the necessity to integrate the native ethnicities into
the Greek system in order to maintain their support for the crown is very important to
understanding his contribution to the Seleucid Empire’s stability during his reign. Through the
granting of more autonomy to communities and the integration of more groups into newly
formed cities, Antiochus IV attempted to stabilize his position in local communities in order to
prevent dissatisfaction and rebellion from the Seleucid Empire and establish stability.
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The majority of the Greek communities in the Seleucid Empire recognized only ethnic
Greeks as citizen making it desirable for some communities to want to be giving the title polis to
be considered more Greek; however, many of the temple communities did not pursue recognition
as a Greek polis. The lack of desire of some non-Greek communities to be Hellenized did not
mean, however, that they did not show signs of Hellenization as the evolution of the East in
general led to the Hellenization of some areas. The locations of municipal mints in the Seleucid
Empire under Antiochus IV highlight this point. Not only did Antiochus IV select many Near
East communities to mint bronze coins, but the coins that they minted show a combination of
Near East and Greek idioms on them. The new system of integration shows Antiochus IV’s
attempts to bringing the people within his empire closer to the monarchy, not by fully
Hellenizing them or creating “one people” like Andrade mentions, but by trying to establish
loyalty between the king and the inhabitance of the cities in the Seleucid Empire to improve the
relationship between different communities and the king in order to help maintain stability, even
in times of decline or conflict.210

Municipal Minting
One way of assessing how Antiochus IV achieved more integration of some of the
different groups throughout the empire and therefore more stability, is to analyze the coinage
struck during this time and the policy surrounding the minting of the coins. Coins depict many
aspects of social, cultural, and political life in antiquity that has been lost in other mediums.
During the reign of Antiochus IV, there were many changes made to the minting process that
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gives insight into the relationship and challenges present between Hellenism and other culture
that existed during his reign.
Antiochus allowed at least eighteen cities in the empire to mint municipal bronzes.211
This was a departure from the minting policy of his predecessors, who reserved minting to more
established, royal mints. These cities show an expansion of a practice of municipal coin
production on a scale that had not been seen in the Seleucid Empire before.212 There were two,
Tyre and Sidon, that were old Phoenician cities, but the rest were all established during the
Seleucid Era including, Alexandria by Issos in Phoenicia, Heirapolis Bambyke in Cyrrhestice,
Laodikeia by the Sea in Phoenicia, Seleukeia in Pieria in Northern Syria, Apameia on the Axios
in Northern Syria, and Edessa in Commagene.213
Most of the newly created mints struck coins bearing the image of Antiochus IV and/or
Zeus, his patron deity.214 One example can be seen at the mint in Ptolemais, also known as
Antioch AKE in South Phoenicia. In Ptolemais, there were coins minted bearing Antiochus IV
image on the obverse and an image of Zeus extending a wreath in his right hand on the
reverse.215 This demonstrates Antiochus IV’s use of propaganda, through the medium of coinage,
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to promote himself as the protector and benefactor of the Greek communities within his
empire.216
Antiochus IV’s minting policy is just one example of his attempt to incorporate more
people into the Seleucid system and bring the communities within his realm closer to the King
through giving them more autonomy. Each community would mint coins bearing the image of
the king, but also strike some coins bearing images revolving around local legends and
divinities.217 As Andrade says, “Greek culture, as expressed through Near East idioms (on
coinage), could bind the Seleucid empire’s diverse communities to their king and each other,
while still facilitating the articulation of local customs.”218 It is believed that this was Antiochus
IV’s goal with his unprecedented policy of expanding the mints within the Seleucid Empire.
Some of the cities Antiochus IV’s allowed to begin minting coins had never minted coins
before and others were only created at the birth of the Seleucid Empire. None of the mints were
in existence prior to the arrival of the Seleucids. 219 This is due to the fact that prior to the rise of
the Seleucids the economy of the East was commodity based with the exception of Babylon. 220
The establishment of mints and municipal coinage by Seleucus I was a way to stimulate the
economy of the empire and create tax revenue. Although in the beginning of circulation it was
mostly reserved for those living on or near the Mediterranean coast and some of the larger cities
inland, the currency based economy expanded to more cities, but were mostly reserved to royal
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mints.221 The allowance of multiple local communities to mint their own bronze was not
conducted a large scale until Antiochus IV, which gave those communities the ability to express
their local traditions through the Hellenic medium.
The expanded circulation of bronze and silver coinage from official mints reached its
peak under Antiochus III’s extensive expansion of the Seleucid Empire, opening up trade from
India to Asia Minor. The increase in trade can be seen in the larger circulation of coinage in
certain areas of the Seleucid Empire such as the Persian Gulf. The Treaty of Apamea caused a
decline in the circulation of coinage almost instantaneously and the circulation remained low
during the reign of Seleucus IV, Antiochus IV’s predecessor. This is based on research
conducted by Salles, showing the variation and quantity of coinage found in certain areas during
excavations. It is suggested that a correlation can be made between the quantities of coinage
found to the amount circulating in the time period the coins were minted.222 This being said,
there are some problems with this approach including the fact that there is no way to prove
definitively when the coins arrived and how they got there; however it does give an idea of the
circulation of coins in the time of Antiochus IV. There was resurgence in the currency found
from the time period of Antiochus IV’s reign (175-164 B.C.) in the Persian Gulf region, which
suggests that an increase in the circulation of coinage occurred under Antiochus IV that was not
seen since the decline after the Treaty of Apamea.223 The findings of Salles also support the idea
that there was a stimulation of the economy that occurred during the reign of Antiochus IV that
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could be attributed to stability brought by both civil and military changes. The coinage minted
under Antiochus IV show a change in Seleucid policy in an effort to unify the people of the
Seleucid Empire through different means; however, this was not Antiochus IV’s only way of
promoting integration.

The Seleucid Greek polis and Land Grants
Through coins minted between 169 B.C. and 164 B.C. another aspect of Antiochus IV’s
attempt to connect the communities of the Seleucid Empire to the king becomes evident.
Antiochus IV instilled the rank of Greek polis on some native Near East communities, a practice
that had not occurred in the Seleucid Empire until after the Treaty of Apamea under Seleucus IV,
and was not widely used until Antiochus IV.224 One of the best examples of Antiochus IV
granting an existing city the rank of polis was in Jerusalem, which became a polis in the late
170’s.225 It shows an example of how the process would take place; beginning with the renaming
of the city, the construction of a gymnasium, and the rededication of the temple to Zeus.226 The
transformation of Jerusalem failed; however, the failure can be better attributed to the oppressive
decrees set forth by Antiochus IV in 167 B.C. and not the initial Hellenization of the city.227
There were other instances of existing communities being given the title of polis throughout the
Seleucid Empire, mostly in Syria and Phoenicia, where the process was highly successful.228
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He also oversaw the establishment of new Hellenistic communities in Cilicia and Syria
where there had not been previous Greek settlements, such as Epiphaneia in Northern Syria and
Epiphaneia on the Euphrates.229 Due to the lack of prior settlement, it is assumed that the
population was mostly native Cilicians or Syrians.230 This is yet another instance where
Antiochus IV attempted to incorporate more people into the empire and increase stability by
bringing more of his people into cities and into the Seleucid system. Also, the possibility of the
new cities inhabitance being of Eastern background as well as Greek, as opposed to primarily
Greek heritage, as was the policy under Antiochus IV’s predecessors, demonstrates a change in
thinking on the part of Antiochus IV with regards to the integration of larger populations of
people within the empire. Although this effort did not incorporate the countryside and not all
inhabitants were incorporated into the new cities, it shows Antiochus’s understanding of what
needed to be done and the strides he initiated to begin to incorporate more groups.
As previously mentioned, the status of Greek polis carried with it different meanings in
the Seleucid Empire than it did in other Hellenized regions.231 The Greek polis, under the early
Seleucid system, was founded and inhabited by individuals who were ethnically Greek and could
prove their Greek genealogy, similar to other areas of the Hellenistic world.232 Under Antiochus
IV, the Seleucid Empire made strides to integrate other groups in the Greek polis system as well;
however, that is not to say that the eastern ethnic groups were considered on the same level as
the Greeks. The groups and their cultures would intermingle, but there was still a distinction
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between the two groups, a distinction that caused much strife internally. The early kings of the
Seleucid Empire did not recognized Near East communities as a Greek polis or give them
patronage. This system of patronage, under Antiochus IV, to Near East communities can be seen
in several cities, most notably Jerusalem. The system of Hellenizing Near East communities did
not account for all communities within the Seleucid Empire and only shows the beginnings of
what will later be used by the Roman imperial period to integrate the East.233
In addition to creating new Greek poleis, the giving of land grants was a method of
incorporating more people in addition to collecting taxes and sustaining military forces that the
Seleucids instilled in the empire. The king, owning the land, would give a grant of land and serfs
in return to the settlers and their future generations paying taxes.234 It is suggested that the goal
of the giving of land grants to individuals in new cities was done in an attempt to stimulate more
economic activity and generate more revenue for the king.235 The land granting system in the
Seleucid Empire was based more on economic considerations than political or military
considerations, as in other societies.236 Temples were treated similarly to cities where the king
would want to reinforce the economic centers located there, sometimes through the granting of
land, which is one of the reasons for the evolution of some communities, such as in Jerusalem,
become integrated into the Greek polis system, by Antiochus.237 He continued this tradition, but
differed slightly from the policy of his predecessors. It had been primarily the custom to give
land grants to groups of people in order to create a new city. Under Antiochus IV, the system
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shifted slightly from giving land grants to groups to giving land grants to individuals and groups
that had already established cities.238
The establishment of new Greek poleis and the expansion of the land granting system
give examples of Antiochus IV’s policies that were put forward to promote stabilization within
and aids in the argument that the Seleucid Empire was not in decline during his reign as cities
were being built and communities were being incorporated and expanded showing at least a
minor degree of prosperity.

Local Autonomy
The relationship between the king and the newly formed and already established
communities is a unique one where Antiochus IV attempted to give a degree of local autonomy
in local affairs in an effort to gain popularity and loyalty form the elite. As previously mentioned,
from the beginning of the Seleucid Empire there had been moderated autonomy for local
communities. This tradition goes back to one of the predecessors of the Seleucid Empire, the
Achaemenid Empire.239 The Seleucids needed to evolve the existing system to fit their Hellenic
system of rule, which, as previously stated, included creating tax revenue from a society that had
mostly never used a currency before.
The concept of local autonomy within the Seleucid Empire was expanded under
Antiochus IV; however, The autonomy given to local communities did not mean that the local
communities held the power to overrule the king. The local governments of the Greek
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communities and other ethnic and temple communities would function semi-independently in
civil matters; however, the king would hold the power to intervene with his armies and officials
if needed.240 An example of this can be seen when the officials intervened in Judea to enforce
Antiochus’s decrees in 167 B.C.241 The locals were given the decrees of the king, who sent
officials to help enforce the laws.
The ability for local rulers to have some degree of autonomy was important to Antiochus
IV and his predecessors to rule their diverse kingdom with a degree of success. Antiochus IV
expanded that system, bringing even more communities closer to the king. He attempted to
increase the prestige and prominence of the Seleucid power by “consolidating the network of
Greek city-states” that incorporated Syria, Phoenicia, and Cilicia.242 Examples of this are his
allowance of certain communities to mint bronzes and incorporating communities into the Greek
polis system.243 Local communities would have to handle their local affairs, which would cost
more money, but the increased control of local elites pleased them and created a situation where
both king and community were satisfied. Antiochus IV wanted to give more control to the local
communities while at the same time establishing a more uniform rule over them and giving them
more connection to the king to ensure their allegiance even in times of decline.
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Religious Tolerance in the Seleucid Empire
In addition to local autonomy, another aspect of Seleucid rule adjusted under Antiochus
IV was religious tolerance. Even though the Hellenistic Seleucids looked down upon ethnically
different people, throughout the history of their empire, the Seleucid Kings were highly tolerant
of local religions.244 The Seleucid royal family was of Hellenistic decent; however, there are
signs that the ruling family, including Antiochus IV, participated in rituals with some of the Near
Eastern temple communities. This was in his attempt to maintain legitimacy of the king’s
authority in the area through giving tribute and establishing relationships with the priestly class
or leading citizens.245 An example of this is seen in the marriage of Diana of Hierapolis to
Antiochus IV where he participated in their local religious rites.246 Antiochus’s
acknowledgement of other religions that existed within the communities of the Seleucid Empire
shows once again that he was skilled in the use of propaganda, as he was attempting to gain good
favor by the people of the area even though they might not be Hellenized in order to establish a
better connection between the king and his people. Whereas the failures of Antiochus IV through
the Maccabean Rebellion are extreme, the failures do not represent the overall policy towards all
ethnic groups within the empire and appears to be more of an outlier than anything else.247
Antiochus IV’s religious policies did not always help integrate more groups into the
Seleucid System. The practice of raiding temples within the Seleucid Empire by the Kings had
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been occurring long before the rise of Antiochus IV; however, his raid of the temple in Jerusalem
in 169 B.C. and 167 B.C. as well as his attempted raid in the East in 164 B.C., led to the
inhabitants of the Seleucid Empire temple communities to become dissatisfied with the Seleucid
rule and rebel when the opportunity presented itself upon the death of Antiochus IV.

Roman Influences
The evolution of the functions of the government under Antiochus IV to incorporate
more groups through city-building, land grants and more freedoms to the local governments
shows a change in the way the Seleucid leadership elected to rule over its people. In addition,
Antiochus IV incorporated some Roman influences into the new system that shows his attempts
to update the Seleucid Empire, suggesting that the empire was not in a state of decline during his
reign.
Aspects of Antiochus IV reign were modeled based upon a Roman model.248 They are
seen through Seleucid entertainment. Through the Procession and subsequent games at Daphne
an increase in Roman influence on the Seleucid Empire can be seen. The Procession at Daphne
was modeled after the Roman Triumph.249 The Syrian forces that led the Procession at Daphne
were armored with Roman style armor.250 The month long event included Gladiatorial combat
games.251 In addition, Roman models can be seen in other aspects of Seleucid society under
Antiochus IV. He built a temple dedicated to Jupiter Capitolinus, which was paneled with

Nick Sekunda, and Angus McBride, Seleucid and Ptolemaic Reformed Armies 168 – 145 BC. Volume
1: The Seleucid Army, (Yorkshire: Montvert Publications, 1994), 4.
249
Tarn, 184.
250
Polybius XXXI: 3.
251
Polybius XXXI: 4.
248

65

gold.252 According to Livy these additions to the capitol city of Antioch brought great joy to the
people of the city.253 The Implementation of New Roman models to Seleucid life shows the
advancement of Seleucid society under Antiochus IV that was just another aspect of his updating
of Seleucid society.

Population Fluctuation and Taxation
Population fluctuation occurred throughout the history of the Seleucid Empire as
satrapies rebelled and were brought back under control of the king. Assessing the population of
the Seleucid Empire is important in evaluating several aspects of Antiochus’s rule. First it shows
the stability in territory in the Seleucid Empire under Antiochus IV as population fluctuations
would relate to the acquisition or loss of territories and suggest the success or failure of
Antiochus IV’s policies and the ability to portray the strength of the empire. Second it directly
relate to the tax revenue earned, a portion of the income of the king was tied to the land;
therefore, looking at the population a better understanding of Antiochus IV’s finances can be
seen. Likewise, looking at the fluctuation of the market through the prices of goods in the
Seleucid Empire prior to, during, and after his reign demonstrates whether his political and social
reforms and military campaigns had a positive or negative impact on these other aspects of the
Empire.
The statistics related to the population and economy of the Seleucid Empire during the
reign of Antiochus IV help to demonstrate the stability he brought to the empire in relation to the
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period of decline after the terms of the treaty of Apamea and the loss of Antiochus III and also to
help reveal the point of decline that followed his death. This section relies heavily on the work of
Aperghis, who was able to map out the population of the Seleucid Empire though analyzing
many different aspects of the Seleucid society, from archeological evidence, to living patterns
and economic conditions, to astrological diaries, taking into consideration the different
conditions for inhabitance in different terrains throughout the Seleucid Empire.254 All combined,
Aperghis creates a close estimation to the population of the Seleucid Empire at different points in
its history. Although these population statistics are estimates they are put into the range that the
actual population is highly unlikely to be outside of.255
Aperghis attempts to find the population range from the creation of the Seleucid Empire
to the coming of Pompey, which allows for a comparison of the population between Antiochus
IV’s reign and other prominent Seleucid kings. The empire experiences two peaks in population
between fourteen and eighteen million in 281 B.C. and 190 B.C., just prior to the Battle of
Magnesia.256 The period just after the battle of Magnesia and the Treaty of Apamea shows the
beginnings of the steep decline in population as portions of the empire were taken away from the
Seleucids through the treaty and others rebelled against the weakened empire. In order to suggest
that Antiochus IV’s reforms and campaigns were successful overall, there must be a distinct
difference in population during the years of his reign from those before and after. With the
conclusion of the Battle of Magnesia and the Treaty of Apamea several parts of the Seleucid
Empire went into rebellion and left the Empire, thus causing a steep decline in the population of
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the Empire until the reign of Antiochus IV. During the Reign of Antiochus IV the population of
the Seleucid Empire stabilized roughly between nine and twelve million.257 The degree of
stability experienced under Antiochus IV is only seen one other time in the history of the empire
under the reign of Seleucus II (246-225). Then, following the death of Antiochus IV the empire
went into another decline in population from which it never recovered.
The stability in the population of the Seleucid Empire after the steep decline suggests a
degree of stabilization in the empire that could be attributed to several aspects of Antiochus IV’s
rule. The stability brought to the Seleucid Empire’s population is a representation of the stability
brought through the lack of rebellions throughout the empire during Antiochus IV’s reign. It is
suggested that this is due to his show of strength in military and political actions both internally
and externally. Throughout the history of the Seleucid Empire the rebellions and defections
usually occurred in times where the empire was in a weakened state. Antiochus IV fought both
militarily and socially to ensure that even through defeat the empire would not continue to
crumble. The successes of his work are evident in the post “Day of Eleusis” where the Seleucids
lost, but Antiochus IV maintained stability in the Empire. This is all shown through the stability
in population shown through Aperghis’ work. Although it is not an exact calculation of
population, the ranges given demonstrate Antiochus IV’s advancement of the Seleucid Empire
preceded and succeeded by decline.
Through assessing the population at the time of Antiochus IV’s rule there can be made a
rough estimate of the revenue from taxation that Antiochus IV received. It is believed that the
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taxing rate under Antiochus IV was roughly one to two talents per thousand people per year.258
Comparing this with the population estimations under Antiochus IV, which would make the
annual income between nine thousand and eighteen thousand talents from taxation making the
maintenance of borders vital to the revenue of the king. The taxation being based on population
makes Antiochus IV’s decisions to attempt to bring back the satrapies in the East and ensure the
provinces in the South do not rebel both a financial decision as well as one to improve the image
of the Empire.
The population of the Seleucid Empire shows many interesting facts about the way the
economy functioned and the amount of people who lived within its borders and suggests that
there was a degree of stability in population brought to the Seleucid Empire under Antiochus IV,
an unprecedented stability that is only seen during the reign of one other ruler in the history of
the Empire.

Seleucid Military Reforms
The success or failure of many of Antiochus IV’s reforms is hard to measure as limited
sources survive; however, that is not the case with his military reforms. After experiencing the
loss at Magnesia and the idleness of his predecessor, Antiochus IV implemented several military
reforms and changes that aided in his successes in battle throughout his reign in several parts of
the empire.
Upon his ascension to the throne, Antiochus IV saw the need to reorganize the Seleucid
military force after the loss of military power. It has already been shown how Antiochus IV’s
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military changes and expeditions were successful in several parts of the Empire, but how he went
about reforming the Empire has yet to be discussed. The phalanx system that the Seleucids had
been using was the same that was used by Alexander the Great many years earlier. Antiochus IV,
knowing the necessity of military victory to the success of his empire then set forth many
reforms that evolved the Seleucid military.
Our knowledge of the military reforms is limited and comes from fragments of ancient
tactical manuals that have survived. The three authors - Asclepiodotus, Aelian and Arrian – all
give similar accounts, sometimes even copying whole passages from each other.259 These authors
give a general understanding for the organization of the Seleucid military force and the changes
that were made under the kingship of Antiochus IV.
The reformed military was made up of light infantry, heavy infantry, cavalry, and
elephants similarly to the previous system; however, the military organization that was put in
place by Antiochus IV closely resembled that of Rome. Antiochus reformed the way the
Seleucid military was armed and fought, leaving the outdated Macedonian style and introducing
a Roman style. This is most notably seen in the Procession at Daphne, where five thousand men
“in the prime of their life” led the procession “armed in the Roman fashion.”260 Although not all
of the Seleucid force was utilizing the new armor and weapons, it was being integrated into the
existing system and was employed in several conflicts.261 Conversely, there were ways the
Seleucid military differed from that of Rome. For example, the size of the basic unit of the
military force differed. Rome had six men in their contuburnium the Seleucids had a half-file of
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eight men.262Antiochus attempted to update the Seleucid army during his reign through
reorganization and the utilization of new era weapons and armor.
There was a form of conscription that allowed the Seleucid Empire to constantly have a
steady flow of new recruits. In the Seleucid Empire the term “Macedonian” was used as a legal
status, with which one was liable for conscription.263 It is possible that this term originated under
the first kings of the Seleucid Empire, as the phalanx at the time would have been comprised of
actual Macedonians who originated in the army of Alexander the Great. The Seleucid system of
land granting would have come with the requirement of serving in the military, and also some
financial privileges.264 The status would have been passed down from father to son. Although
this system was not a new one, its implementation during the reign of Antiochus IV proved to be
instrumental and showed a high level of organization as there was a high demand for large
military forces on several fronts and he was able to maintain a large army throughout his reign.
In addition to the reforms of the army, Antiochus needed to address the absence of a navy
in the Seleucid Empire. He could create more ships himself; however, he had to keep in mind the
political repercussions with Rome and not break the terms of the treaty to the point where the
Romans became upset. He was required not to have a naval fleet larger than ten ships and had to
figure out how to maintain a navy while keeping in Rome’s good graces. The solution that
Antiochus IV decided on was to create an alliance with a naval power already in existence:
Rhodes.
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Rhodes was putting forth an effort to reinvigorate its naval fleet due to its lack of ability
to build and sail more than six ships in the Third Macedonian War, possibly due to warring
factions within Rhodes itself.265 In 172 or 171 B.C. Antiochus IV offered Rhodes an alliance and
promised the delivery of either wood to build the ships or already built ships, the exact details are
unknown. The agreement to help Rhodes rebuild its navy gave Antiochus IV the excuse he
needed to begin to rebuild war ships in his own territory.266 This was Antiochus’s strategy for
building war ships without having a standing navy that exceeded the terms of the treaty, as he
could claim that the ships were meant for the Rhodian fleet. This expanded fleet that Antiochus
IV had at his disposal becomes apparent after his death when a Roman embassy arrived in
Antioch demanding that the ships be burned.267 In late 170 B.C., with the rise of the Sixth Syrian
War, Antiochus would use the war ships he now had against the Ptolemaic Empire where it
would be successful in naval battles in Cyprus and aid the army’s campaign into Egypt.268
Antiochus IV’s military reforms proved to be successful in the campaigns against Egypt
and Armenia. His updates to the Seleucid army based on Roman and other models and his
tactical maneuver to restock his depleted naval fleet show Antiochus IV’s awareness of the
necessity of military reform. Prior to the rise of Antiochus IV, the Seleucid Empires military
force was still broken from the treaty of Apamea. After his revitalization of the military, the
Seleucid Empire was a regional power once again during the later years of Antiochus IV’s reign.
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The Internal Deterioration post-Antiochus IV
Although Antiochus IV made many strides during his reign to maintain short term and
long term stability in the Seleucid Empire, and was successful in keeping the Seleucid Empire
out a state of decline, the series of internal conflicts that followed his death would lead to the
decline of the empire. Very few Seleucid kings were able to find any degree of success after
Antiochus IV’s death. Not only did the death of Antiochus IV mean the end to the Eastern
campaign to regain control of the lost territories, but also it left the door open for other provinces
to rebel against the Seleucid Empire at a vulnerable point, with both internal and external
problems, something Antiochus had been trying to avoid. For example, Armenia, which had just
been brought back under Seleucid control, reverted back to its independence. In addition,
Antiochus IV’s raids of temples and their communities, as seen in Jerusalem and Elymais, to
raise funds led to discontent in temple communities and once given the opportunity to rebel upon
his death they did. This increased the local autonomy and gave rise to local dynasties that would
also aid in the decline of the centralized power of the Seleucid Empire. 269
Adding to and aiding in the decreased authority over the communities within the Seleucid
Empire after the death of Antiochus IV was the period of extreme internal strife that hindered the
success of the empire through almost continual competition for the throne. The strength of any
government can be seen in the ability of its leadership succession to occur without huge political
and military strife. Andrade cites “dynastic civil wars” as one of the main causes of the Post
Antiochus IV decline, and the existing evidence supports that theory.270
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With Antiochus IV’s rise a split occurred in the royal family of the Seleucid Empire.
Antiochus IV named his son Antiochus V king, however the son of Seleucus IV, Demetrius I
believed that he was the rightful heir leading to a split over who should rule. Upon the death of
Antiochus IV, Demetrius I, who was given over to Rome during his father’s reign as a “pledge of
good faith,” believed that he was the rightful heir to the throne of the Seleucid Empire and went
before the Senate to plead his case for the throne in 163 B.C.271 Currently, the son of Antiochus
IV, Antiochus V, was king even though he was just a young boy with Lysias as his guardian. The
Romans did not want to put a charismatic twenty three year old Demetrius I into the seat of
power when they could much easier manipulate the young boy and his advisors. Just two years
later in 161 B.C. Demetrius I escaped from Rome and arrived back in Antioch where he
subsequently killed Antiochus V and took control of the throne himself.272 Demetrius I, unlike
Antiochus IV, did not involve his subjects into the royal spectacles and gained much discontent
from his citizens. The discontent led to an uprising by Alexander Balas who falsely claimed to be
the son of Antiochus IV. Balas gained the support of Pergamum, similarly to the way Antiochus
IV came into power, and took control of the Seleucid throne, killing Demetrius I and forcing
Demetrius II to flee in 150 B.C.273 This conflict is just the first of many that caused internal
conflict and competition that aided in the disintegration of the central authority of the Seleucid
Empire.
In addition to the civil conflict between Demetrius I and Antiochus V, another series of
unrest occurs later under Demetrius II. As seen in chapter two Demetrius II returns from hiding
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in 147 B.C. and successfully retook the throne with the backing of Ptolemy VI at the Battle of
Antioch in 145 B.C. Shortly after Demetrius’s ascension to the throne, Diodorus, the military
commander in Apamea who was dissatisfied with the way Demetrius II had treated the troops
after his arrival in Antioch, promoted the son of Alexander Balas, a Usurper himself, as the
rightful heir to the throne.274 Demetrius II was forced to flee the capital in 144 B.C. as a military
force, led by Diodotus, invaded Antioch claiming Alexander Balas’ son as their king and giving
him the name Antiochus VI.275 However he was only two years old, therefore, Diodotus became
the guardian and, essentially, ruler of the Seleucid Empire, bringing a military general and
usurper once gain to the throne of the Seleucid Empire. Although, Demetrius was never officially
removed from power so there is a period of roughly five years where both leaders were
technically king.276 Antiochus VII would later kill Diodotus in 138 B.C. as he came into power
after the Parthians captured Demetrius II. This episode highlights the lack of continuity in the
royal line of succession and the constant civil unrest that embodied the post-Antiochus IV
Seleucid Empire. The military loss of Demetrius II in rout to Egypt in his attempt to aid in the
Ptolemaic civil war also shows the deteriorated state of the military as they barely got to Egypt
before they were completely destroyed.
The repeated failures of later Kings in the external conflicts led to more loss of territory
throughout the weakened Empire. The decline of the population in the empire shows an example
of its weakened state that exists place after the period of stability under Antiochus IV ends. The
conflicts over succession, in addition to the strengthening powers of Rome and Parthia,
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preoccupied and crippled the empire, making it easy for more provinces to rebel, gaining
independent rule, or be conquered by Parthia. The population fell to between nine and seven
million in roughly fifteen years (150 B.C.) and by the mid first century B.C. the population of the
Seleucid Empire fell well below one million.277 The loss of territory and population has a direct
impact on the functionality of the Seleucid Empire, as the tax revenue would have been
significantly diminished as territories slowly either left the empire or were conquered by other
growing powers.
According to Livy, the relationship between Antiochus IV and Rome was a good one but
with very firm boundaries.278 Rome was the dominant power and as long as Antiochus IV did not
do anything to hurt Rome the friendship stood relatively strong. Upon his death the situation
changed and the Romans needed to reaffirm their strength over the new Seleucid ruler which
regressed some of the military advancements made under Antiochus IV’s reign.
The increased scrutiny and power of the Roman Empire, in addition to the rise of the
Parthian Empire mentioned in chapter 2, added to the internal conflicts that all combined to
establish the full decline of the Seleucid Empire. Under the successor of Antiochus IV,
Antiochus V, the Romans began to require a stricter adherence to the terms of the Treaty of
Apamea. The Romans sent Gnaeus Octavius, Spurius Lucretius and Lucius Aurelius to burn the
naval vessels and kill the elephants that were in disobedience of the terms of the Treaty of
Apamea.279 This shows the Roman intervention in Seleucid affairs and the reinforcement of the
terms of the Treaty of Apamea after the death of Antiochus IV. In the end it would be Rome,
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under the command of Pompey that would bring the crippled and miniscule Seleucid Empire
under Roman control in 63 B.C.

Conclusion: The Impact of the Loss of Antiochus IV
Antiochus IV made many reforms to the society of the Seleucid Empire in his attempt to
strengthen it both militarily and socially. His political and economic efforts attempting to bring
the inhabitance of the Seleucid Empire closer to one another and also be able to maintain their
independent identity. The success or failure of his endeavors to rebuild the Seleucid Empire is
unable to be fully addressed as his death on campaign in the East ushered in a new stage of
internal and external conflict to the Seleucid Empire that would eventually see its demise.
The true impact of Antiochus IV on the Seleucid Empire can be seen in his attempt to
rebuild what had been lost with the Treaty of Apamea. Militarily he was able to rebuild, update
and sustain a standing military force including the navy. His successes in battle after the loss of
troops, funds, and territory at the treaty of Apamea show his understanding of the necessity of a
strong military force in stabilizing the empire. Antiochus IV’s military reforms show his ability
to adapt to the changing technology of the times. His implementation of Roman style armor and
weapons as seen in the procession at Daphne as well as the changes he made to the formations of
the Seleucid Empires military force helps show how his rebuilding of the Seleucid force was
successful.
In addition to his military reforms, Antiochus IV attempted to integrate the multitude of
groups he ruled through attempting to bring them closer to the throne through city building, landgranting and integrating more autonomy for cities while also boosting their connection to the
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throne through minting and the establishment of Greek polis in existing communities. This can
all be accredited to his understanding that he needed to make sure all groups remained loyal to
the king to ensure stability and prevent communities from rebelling against the king.
Antiochus IV died only twelve years into his reign and with his death came the end of the
period of stabilization in the Seleucid Empire as they would fall into a decline riddled with
internal and external conflicts all while the powers of Rome and Parthia gained power and
slowly dismantling the Seleucid Empire until it was no more than the city of Antioch and its
surrounding lands 63 B.C.
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Conclusion
The reign of Antiochus IV brought stability to the Seleucid Empire that suggests the
empire did not fall into a full decline after the Treaty of Apamea and that it was not until after the
death of Antiochus IV that the Seleucid Empire fell into a decline from which they would not
recover. He had the vision to see many of the problems within his Empire, from domestic issues
of ethnic identity to external issues of defected provinces. This vision helped to maintain the
stability of the large Empire during his reign, however, some of his policies also aided in the
decline of the Empire that would follow his death. Therefore, it is true that the treaty of Apamea
and the loss of Antiochus III did not cause the decline of the Seleucid Empire and that Antiochus
IV was able to restore some of the prestige of the Seleucid Empire that had been lost due to the
repercussions of the treaty; however, the political, social, and military moves of the king also
caused discontent in several parts of the empire that would lead the less prominent kings that
succeeded Antiochus IV to have to deal with more defections and more discontent that aided in
the decline of the Empire. Although, Antiochus IV was not the sole cause of the decline of the
Seleucid Empire he did have an impact on it.
When looking at the Seleucid Empire it is easy to see the rebellious nature of the exterior
provinces as a sign of weakness of the Seleucid system. However, looking at the Seleucid
Empire from this angle it is far less stated how loyal the provinces in the Mesopotamian region
of the empire were. Hellenization took hold in the elites of these regions and the Seleucid kings
are seen as patrons.280 This area shows the ability for the Seleucid system to work and that the
Empire was not a failure from its inception.
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Antiochus IV was able to field armies totaling around roughly 75,000 between his two
campaigns, to the south and to the East, and upwards of 55,000 in 162 B.C. just after his death at
the battle of Beith-Zacharia.281 Even with a large portion of these troops being mercenaries it
shows the ability for Antiochus IV to fund and raise a large army even after the defeat of his
father and be at least mildly successful on the battlefield. Although there were attempts at
campaigns after his death under Demetrius II and Antiochus VII none came close to the size or
success of Antiochus IV.
Antiochus IV had great successes off the battlefield as well. He was able to use the tool
of propaganda to his benefit in many situations throughout his reign to benefit himself and the
Seleucid Empire as a whole. The procession at Daphne and the expansion of the municipal mints
are examples of the successes of Antiochus IV’s propaganda skills. In addition he was a good
politician in the Hellenistic world and with Rome. He was constantly giving tribute and
patronizing many Greek communities both within and outside of his domain. In regards to Rome,
as mentioned in Green, political dealings were “shrewd, cautious, and diplomatic.”282 They were
also successful as Antiochus IV was able to manipulate the relationship, allowing him to rebuild
parts of his army that were against the terms of the Treaty of Apamea.
Although some historians argue that the reforms that Antiochus implemented in his reign
aided in the decline of the Seleucid Empire it is hard to make that conclusion based on the events
that occurred. Antiochus IV was attempting to integrate more cultural groups into the modified
Hellenistic system that had evolved at that point. At the point of his death his campaign in the
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East ceased immediately. It is unknown how that campaign could have evolved the Seleucid
empire and its relations with the growing Parthian power had Antiochus IV survived and
continued the campaign. There are too many variables to attach the decline of the Seleucid
Empire to the reforms and decisions made by Antiochus IV directly.
The decline of the Seleucid Empire occurred for numerous reasons. The internal civil
wars of succession, the ethnic differences within the vast empire and their lack of assimilation
leading to more autonomy as a weakened government could not enforce their laws and power
throughout. The Growing power of Rome preventing the Seleucids from expanding west and
crippling its military once again during the reign of Antiochus V. Parthia expanding its territory
westward, slowly taking over Seleucid territories. All of these issues both external and internal
combined to deteriorate the Seleucid Empire. By the death of Antiochus VII the Seleucid Empire
has been reduced to Cilicia and Northern Syria and would never take battle to the great powers
again.283 Finally, in 63 B.C. the Seleucid Empire that had deteriorated to just an empire in name
was taken by Pompey and became a Roman province.
In addressing Antiochus IV’s reign Tarn brings up several questions that give light to the
political and social position of Antiochus IV and the Seleucid Empire during his rule:
“Why was he hailed Saviour of Asia? Why did Diodorus (reproducing Polybius) say that
in 165 he was stronger than any other king? Why did Jason of Cyrene, who loathed his
memory, say that his power seemed irresistible? And why, above all, did Mithridates I of
Parthia… made no move till the broken nervy Seleucid was safely dead?”284
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All of these questions express the thesis of this work and the simple answer is that he brought
stability and staved off decline during his reign. Antiochus IV brought the Seleucid Empire out
of the decline that was caused by the Treaty of Apamea and established the prestige to a degree
that the Seleucid Empire was the major power in the East.
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